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As cities  in developing  countries  grow,  the need  adequate  services?  To what  extent  are such
to meet  increasing  demand  for urban  infrastruc-  failures  caused  by lack of capacity  expansion  or
ture services  has  become  an  important  policy  by poor operations  and maintenance?  How  do
problem.  Failure  to respond  adequately  affects  inappropriate  pricing  and  user charges  contribute
productivity  and the quality  of life  in those  to the problem?  What  options  exist in terms  of
cities.  investment,  technology,  institutions,  regulations,
and  financing?
To make  the Bank's  lending  programs  in
this  area more effective,  greater  understanding  is  Based  on empirical  observations,  Lee and
needed  of:  (1) the ways inadequate  services  Anas suggest  policy  options  for improving  the
affect business  and  productivity  in urban  areas,  provision  of infrastructure  services  in Nigeria,
(2) the options  for more efficiently  providing  the first country  for which  the Bank  has under-
and maintaining  the delivery  of  various  infra-  taken  this type  of research:
structure  services  (such  as electricity,  water,
transport,  telecommunications,  and  waste  *  Regulatory  changes  to enable  fuller  use of
disposal),  and  (3) potential  cost  savings  from  existing  private capacity  (for example,  allowing
improved  services.  the sale of excess  private  electrical  power).
Lee and Anas report  research  responses  to  *  Participation  of the  private  sector  in the
such questions  (on  the demand  side)  as:  How do  supply of infrastructure-related  services.
firms  respond  to the constraints  caused  by
deficient  infrastructure?  What altematives  do  *  Pricing  policies  that are  more efficient  in
firms have, and what do they cost?  IE the private  the presence of congestion, system failures, and
provision of services a viable alternative to their  variations (b> firm size and location) in the
public provision?  private provision of services.
They also report responses to questions on
the supply side:  What causes failure to deliver
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I.  INTRODUCTION
1.01  In  many  countries  in  Africa,  infrastructure  provision  suffers  from  two
kinds  of inefficiencies.  The  first  is the  presence  of a public  sector  with a
relatively  high level of capital investment  in place but which remains
non-performing  or unable to provide steady and  reliable infrastructural
services. The second,  a consequence  of the  first,  is that  many  users  of the
public infrastructural  services find it Tiecessary  to provide their own
facilities  in  whole  or in part  by incurring  the  much  higher  costs  of private
provision. These  two  extremes,  (i)  the  non-performing  public  sector  and (ii)
the  private  provision  responses  of firms,  are  well  known  to  exist  in  Nigeria.
1.02  The solution  to this problem  of  infrastructural  deficiencies  in
Nigeria  and other  African  countries  is not likely  to be a technological  one.
It is generally  understood  that in these  countries  large  additional  capital
outlays  or extensive  rehabilitation  programs  cannot  be fully  effective  without
progress  in  improving  institutional  organization,  logistical  support  services,
and  administration.  Yet,  it is  these  areas  which  are  the  least  well  understood
and  where  progress  has  remained  elusive,  difficult  and  unpredictable.  Thus,  it
is realistic to  assume that the public sector will continue to remain
non-performing  for  some time  to come  and that  the infrastructural  deficiency
problem  will  need to  be addressed  in a  way  which  minimizes  the  social  cost  in
a  shorter  timeframe.  This  would  require  fine-tuning  regulatory  regimes  and  the
existing  institutional  structure,  and coming  up with more efficient  pricing
policies  in  order  to  induce  active private  sector participation in
infrastructure  service  provisions.
1.03  The purpose  of this paper is threefold.  First,  we document  how
infrastructural  deficiencies  affect  manufacturing  firms  of different  sizes  in
different  regions. Second,  we describe  how firms  respond  to the  deficiencies,
identify  the  costs  of these  responses,  and  estimate  the  extent  of  private  cost
as a  measure  of the  willingness  of firms  to  pay  for  reliable  services. Third,
based  on these  observations,  we offer  alternative  policy  options  Lor  improving
infrastructure  provisions  in  Nigeria.  These  policy  options  provide  alternatives
between  the two  extremes  of the  not.-performing  public  sector  and  the private
provision  by individual  manufacturers.  The policy  options  discussed  in this
paper include: (i) regulatory  changes for enabling  fuller  utilization  of
existing  private  provisior.  capacities,  for example,  by allowing  the sale of
excess  private  power supply;  (ii) private  sector  participation  in selected
infrastructure support  activities, such  as  production, distribution,
maintenance,  metering  or  revenue  collection;  and (iii)  alternative  pricing  and
tariff  strategies  which  exploit  observed  variations  in private  provisions  by
firm  size  and  location.
1.04  Our  analyses  in  this  paper  are  based  on  the  empirical  results  from  the
survey  of  manufacturing  establishments  conducted  for  this  research  project.  The- 2 -
questionnaire  was  developed  by the  World  Bank  (supported  by then  the  West  Africa
Regional Research Fund)  in  collaboration  with  the  Nigerian Industrial
Development  Bank.  The  field  survey  was Implemented  by Arthur  Andersen  & Co.,
Lagos.  A  stratified  random sample  wee drawn from the sample frame of
manufacturing  establishments  provided  y  the Nigerian Federal Office of
Statistics.  The  sample  covered  five  states: Lagos,  Anambra,  Imo,  Kaduna  and
Kano.  The  survey  consisted  of 36 pages  witL 349  computer  readablo  variables,
and  was  completed  in  late  1988  for  179  manufacturing  establishments.  The  sample
firms covered all manufacturing  industries  (at the two-digit  level of the
Standard  Industrial  Classification)  and  a continuum  of firm  sizes  as measured
by employment.  (See  Appendix  Tables  A19  through  A23  for  the  sample  outcome  and
the composition  of sample  firms.)  Infrastructural  deficiencies  and firms'
private  provision  responses  are  covered  for  five  subsec-,rs:  electricity,  water
supply,  transportation  of freight  and  personnel,  telecommunications,  and  waste
disposal. (The  Nigerian  Industrial  Development  Bank  has  completed  the  survey
i  un  additional  66  establishments  among  its  client  firms. This  data  is  still
'  processed  and  not  included  in  our  analysis  in  this  paper.)
1.05  The  paper  is  organized  as  follows.  Chapter  II  documents  and  discusses
the  extent,  apparent  causes,  and  incidence  of infrastructural  deficiencies  in
Nigeria. We have  drawn  from  the  World  Bank  project  reports,  institutional  and
other qualitative  information  on the state and causes of deficiencies  in
selected  infrastructural  subsectors  in  order  to  complement  the  information  from
the  establishment  survey  data  collected.  Chapter  III  focuses  on  the  alternative
private provision responses of manufacturers.  Prior to  the  survey of
establishments,  our  knowledge  of  private  response  options  of  the  firms  was  based
on rough aggregate  figures,  anecdotal  descriptions  of selected  cases, or
specific  field interviews  of several firms.  The survey  findings  clearly
document  the  presence  of  a  wide range  of responses,  and  the  frequency  of their
occurrences,  and  also their  incidence  and  costs  by region,  size of firm,  and
other  characteristics.  Chapter  IV  presents  the  estimates  of capital  costs  of
various  private  provisions  and  analyzes  the  private  cost as a measure  of the
willingness  of firms  to  pay  for  reliable  services.  Chapter  V discusses  several
policy  options  developed  and  their  economic  rationale.  To  the  extent  possible,
we use the  survey  results  to  give  a  preliminary  empirical  justification  of the
potential  benefits  of the  policy  options  considered.
1.06  To make quantitative  estimates  of the benefits  of the suggested
policies  it  will  be  necessary  to  implement  empirically  the  analytical  framework
developed  in  Anas  and  Lee (1988),  by estimating  the  degree  by which  individual
firms in the sample  will respond  to changes  in policies  such as tariffs  or
regulatory  constraints.  The  current  paper  sets  the  stage  for  such  an analysis
by identifying  the  ap,  -opriate  response  patterns. The  plan  for  an econometric
analysis  and the ass. Lated  measurement  needs are briefly  mentioned  in the
concluding  section.-3-
II.  THE  EXTENT  AND  CAUSES  OF INFRASTRUCTURE  DEFICIENCIES
2.01  It is common knowledge that Nigerian  manufacturers  suffer from
frequent  interruptions  of  publicly  provided  services  such  as  electricity,  water,
telecommunications  transport,  and  waste  disposal  and  by tne  poor quality  of
these  services  when and  where they are available. A detailed  discussion  of
these  problems  for  each  infrastructural  sector  is  given  in  Anas  and  Lee (1988;
pp.3-8).
2.02  The Nigerian  Industrial  Development  Bank, the collaborating  local
institution  of  this  study,  has  been  particularly  concerned  about  these  problems,
since  financing  industrial  projects  has  been its  main activity. According  to
NIDB's  staff,  frequent  power  cuts  and  voltage  fluctuations  have forced  almost
every  industrial  establishment  in  the  country  to  undertake  extra  investments  in
generators  in order  to avoid  production  losses  as  well as damage  to machinery
ard  equipment.  For  similar  reasons,  extra  investments  are  also  made  in  sinking
boreholes  and  installing  water  treatment  plants. Such  extra  investments  raise
industrial  costs  and  make  it  difficult  for  local  industrial  products  to  compete
in  price  with  their  imported  counterparts.  By  unduly  enlarging  the  overhead  and
running  costs,  they  lengthen  the  gestation  period  of industrial  projects.
2.03  State monopoly  enterprises  such as the Nigerian Electric Power
Authority  (NELA)  or the  Nigerian  Telephone  Company  (NITEL)  have  a large  amount
of  capital  investment  X  ready  in  place  but  fail  to  deliver  their  services  at  the
level  required  to  meet the  demand. Such  failures  not  only  result  in  the  waste
of scarce  resources  but also significantly  affect  manufacturing  and other
productive  activities  in the  Nigerian  economy. Therefore,  it is important  to
emphasize  that  infrastructure  services  are  intermediate  inputs  used  in  producing
final  goods  and  services  and  that  the  inadequate  supply  of these  services  will
adversely  affect  the  productivity  growth  of  industries  and  economic  development
in  general.
2.04  The  causes  of  infrastructural  failures  may  be  grouped  into  two  kinds.
The first is relatively  well understood  and relates  to shortcomings  of the
technology used by the  public  sector,  including  problems  in the  day to day
management,  and  operation  and  maintenance  of  the  facilities.  The  second  is  more
complex  in  nature  and  less  well  controlled,  and  relates  to  general  problems  with
administration,  bureaucracy,  planning,  metering,  billing  for  services  delivered,
revenue  collection,  personnel  training  in the public sector,  and lack of
appropriate  incentives  for  management  and personnel  in part because  of civil
service  pay  ceilings. This  second  set  of factors  has remained  the  key  problem
over  the  years  because  further  investments  in  additional  facilities  is easily
rendered  ineffective  if the institustional  organization  and logistical  support
systems  are  lacking.
2.05  Assessing  the  actual  burdens  imposed  by the  current  inadequacies  and
the  costs  of ongoing  adjustments  will  be useful  as the  government  continues  to
make strategic investment  choices which involve the  following types of
trade-offs:  (i)  among  different  users  of the  infrastructural  services  such  as
residential  versus  manufacturing;  (ii)  between  additional  capital  investments-4-
versus  mainte&ance  and  rehabilitation  of  existing  facilities  or  the  training  and
recruitment  cf  personnel;  (iii)  among  different  infrastructural  subsectors  such
as electric  power  versus  telecommunications;  (iv)  between  as i'ell  as within
regions  and  cities;  (v)  between  alternative  pricing  and  tariff  structures;  (vi)
between assisting  the private sector  in its self-provision  efforts  versus
supporting  further the public infrastructure  sectors,  and  (vii) between
different organizational  and  structural  reforms focused on deregulation,
commercialization,  and the partial  privatization  of selected  infrastructure
related  functions  in individual  subsectors.
A.  Causes  of the  Deficiencies
2.06  World  Bank  studies  and  project  work  in  the  last  decade  have  documented
the extent  and causes of infrastructural  failures  in each sector.  Taking
electricity  generation  as  one  example,  the  current  situation  can  be gleaned  from
two  project  appraisal  reports  which  are  eight  years  apart  (World  Bank,  1981  and
1989). The  basic  types  and  causes  of  failure  remain  essentially  unchanged  over
the  entire  decade  of  the  1980s. Technological  causes  of  failure  in  this  sector
are primarily  related  to transmission  and distribution. The ratio of the
available  capacity  to that  of the installed  capacity  is generally  low  and  as
much  as 50 percent  of installed  capacity  may  be essentially  inoperable  at any
given  time. However, operable generating capacity is  still considered
substantial  and essentially  adequate. Most power interruptions  (nearly  two
thirds) are a result of bottlenecks  on the transmission  and distribution
networks.  These  recurring  transmission  problems  are  believed  to  be due to  the
lack  of  spare  parts  or the  delays  in  obtaining  them. In  addition,  shortages  of
materials,  vehicles  and  foreign  exchange  have  been the  key factors  which  have
constrained  the expansion  of the  distribution  system. In recent  years  these
factors  have  been aggravated  by the  sharp  fall  in the  price  of oii  which  has
reduced  the  public  budget,  as  well  as by the  sharp  devaluation  in  the  value  of
the  naira  which  makes  imported  spare  parts  even  more expensive. A persistent
problem  has  been  the  frequent  overloading  of transformers.  The fact  that  only
400  to  500  of  NEPA's  fleet  of 3000  vehicles  are  operational  has systematically
hampered  routine  maintenance  of  the  distribution  network. Similarly,  properly
trained  personnel  is  the  apparent  cause  of  failures  to  maintain  circuit  breakers
on  the  transmission  network. Another  area which  contributes  to these  problems
is  the  inadequacy  of  NEPA's  monitoring  facilities  in  its  National  System ontrol
Center  which  is  supposed  to  track  and  quickly  service  failing  components  on the
national  network  (World  Bank,  1989).
2.07  Most recent studies have paid attention  to the nontechnological
factors  contributing  to power interruptions  and failures,  and the current
government  efforts  to  partially  commercialize  a  number  of  parastatals  have  also
included  NEPA (World  Bank,  1989). NEPA will therefore  have  more autonomy  in
wage  and  compensation  policy,  tariff  setting  and  in  determining  its  own  capital
expenditure  program. It is  generally  recognized  that  current  NEPA tariffs  for
electricity  have  essentially  no  relationship  to  economic  opportunity  costs.  For
example,  electricity  tariffs  remain  unchanged  since  1979  when  they  were  raised
to 7  kobos  per kWh.  At this  level,  it is  estimated  that  they  are about  one
seventh  of the  long  run  marginal  cost  of supply  and  do  not  even  cover  the  cash
operating  costs  of  generation,  transmission  and  distribution.  It is  known  thatin most of developed  and advanced  developing  countries  such as Korea, the
tariff  per  kWh  is about  7  US cents  (52.5  kobos). With the  already  established
commercialization  of the Nigerian  National  Petroleum  Company (NNPC)  which
supplies  gas  fuel  to  NEPA,  gas  prices  are  going  up and  NEPA  would  have  to raise
its electricity  tariff  soon,  as NEeA becomes  subject  to a higher  degree  of
market  discipline. In addition,  it has been recommended  that the tariff  be
raised  in  stages  in  the  next  several  years  (World  Bank,  1989).
2.08  The  problems  of  underpricing  are  also  observed  in  water  supply. The
Lagos  State  Water  Commission  (LSWC)  since  1986  is  operating  under  a  new  tariff
which  raised  water  prices  for  manufacturers  by about  40  percent  and  a further
increase  of 270 percent  was due for approval.  A vendor licensing  system
authorized  to levy  direct  charges  for  water  sold  at public  standposts  is  under
discussion  (World  Bank,1988).  Since industrial  water use is beginning  to
exhaust  the  groundwater  supplies  of  the  Lagos  State  region,  it  is  reasonable  to
expect that tariff  increases  for industrial  use of water may become more
feasible in  the  future.  (More detailed discussions  of  the  causes of
deficiencies  appear  in  Lee,  Stein,  and  Lorentzen,  1989.)
B.  The  Incidence  of  the  Deficiencies  by Firm  Size  and  Region
2.09  Our  data reveal  that  there  are  large  variations  in the  availability
and quality  of public  infrastructure  services  and in firms'  private  provision
responses  across  regions  and  firm  sizes.  Such  observations  imply  an important
role  'fn  government  strategy  regarding  infrastructural  policy  reform.  Variations
in  private  provision  patterns  can  be summarized  as  follows. Figure  1  and  Table
Al in Appendix  show  that  only 14 out  of the  179  firms,  or 7.8  percent  do not
have  their  own  electricity  generators.  Twelve  of  these  firms  are  in  Anambra  and
Imo and two are in Lagos  while  all firms  in Kaduna  and Kano  have their  own
generators. For  the  firms  that  do not  have their  own  generators  (or  "captive
firms"),  the  supply  is  not  100  percent  reliable. Figure  2 and  Table  A2 in the
Appendix  show  that  the  captive  firms  are  generally  small  ones. Moreover,  Figure
3  and  Table  A3 show  that  the  smaller  firms  are  subject  to the  bulk  of  the  power
failure  incidents.  Some  small  firms  do  not  have  their  own  generating  equipment,
not  because  the  burden  of  poor  electricity  supplies  is less  per  unit  of output
for them,  but rather  because  the  generation  cost  per unit of electricity  is
higher  for  them  because  of economies  of  scale  in  electricity  generation.
2.10  The subsequent  figures  and tables  in the  Appendix  show  that small
firms  are  the  ones  that  cannot  afford  capital  investmets  for  boreholes  (Figure
4, Table  A4 and Figure  A3),  for  vehicles  for  the  sh:.  ent  of products  (Figure
5,  Table  A5 and  Figure  A4), for  motor  cycles  and  for  couriers  (Figure  6, Table
A6 and  Figure  A5),  and  for  radio  equipment  (Figure  7,  Table  A7 and  Figure  A6).
Compared  to the  other  two  regions,  Anambra-Imo  has a higher  concentration  of
small  firms  and  the  burden  of  inadequate  infrastructure  seems  to  be  more  serious
there.
2.11  The  heavy  incidence  of infrastructural.  failures  among  small  firms  has
an implication  for the  growth  of industries  and the  generation  of employment.
According  to the "incubator  hypothesis"  that  was tested  in the earlier  Bank
research  on  industrial  location  in  Bogota  (Lee,  1989a)  and  in  Seoul  (Lee,  1985),-6-
it was observed  that small  new firms  spend their  early  years  near the city
center  or in  an  old  industrial  area  with  easy  access  to  good  utilities  and  other
essential  services. They  du.  so  because  it  is  prohibitively  expensive  for  small
firms  to operate  in  outlying  areas  where  infrastructure  services  are  poor.  As
they  grow  and  become  r.ore  independent,  they  tend  to  move  out  of the  central  area
for  more  space. In  Nigeria  and  perhaps  in  most  African  countries,  large  cities
w'.th  poor infrastructure  cannot  offer the incubator  function  for small  new
firms. Since  small  firms  cannot  afford  their  own  generators  and  boreholes  and
other  facilities,  the  burdens  of inadequate  public  infrastructure  services  are
especially  severe  for the small  firms  which  start  and grow in those  cities.
This  has  a serious  negative  implication  for  the  birth  and  growth  of small  firms
and  for  the  generation  of employi-int  and  income. The studies  mentioned  above
(Lee  1985,  1989a)  showed  that  small  new  firms  generate  between  60 to  80  percent
of  the  new  jobs  created  in  large  cities  in  Asia  and  Latin  America. This  implies
high  returns in Nigeria to  selectively  improving infrastructure  service
provisions  for particular  users  at particular  locations,  since the obselved
service  reliability  problems  are  to  an  extent  location  and  user  specific.-7-
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III. ALTERNATIVE  RESPONSES  OF  MANUFACTURERS
3.01  There are essentially  four ways in which firms  might respond to
infrastructural  deficiencies.  These are:  (i) relocation;  (ii) factor
substitution;  (iii)  private  provision;  and (iv)  output  reduction. Below  we
discuss  the  economic  rationale  behind  each  of these  responses,  and  why  they  are
or are  not  observed  in  Nigeria.
A.  Relocation
3.02  The firm  may  relocate  to a site  with  better  infrastructure  services.
Such  relocation  can occur  within  a city or from  one region  to another. Our
survey  results  show  that  Nigerian  firms  do  not  move  to other  locations  from  the
initial  site.  Even  though  50  percent  of the  firms  had  been at their  present
location  since  1980,  only  two  out  of the  179  sample  firms  indicated  that  they
had relocated  from another  location. This absence  of mobility  is striking
considering  that the average  annual  moving  rate  observed  in large  cities  in
other  developing  countries  is about 5 percent.  The relative  immobility  of
Nigerian  firms  is consistent  with the  fact that  the  capacity,  regularity  and
quality  of infrastructure  vary from  bad to worse  within  and across  Nigerian
cities (as shown in  Chapter II).  This tends to  limit the  gains in
infrastructure  quality that can be achieved  by moving to new  locations.
Nigerian  firms  instead  undertake  their  own  extensive  capital  expenditures  (to
be discussed  below)  and incur  regular  operations  and maintenance  outlays  to
provide  their  own  services. The  high  setup  cost  with  a  large  amount  of initial
capital  investment  for  own service  provision  would  make it difficult  for the
firms  to  move.
3.03  Another  problem  with  relocation  is  that  it  often  involves  trading  one
infrastructural  deficiency  for  another.  For  example,  a  firm  that  moves  into  the
Lagos  area  because  it is  much  cheaper  to  sink  boreholes  there  (since  the  water
table is high), might  better its water supply,  but the firm may face new
problems  such as losses  in production  time due to the commuting  delays  of
employees.
B.  Factor  Substitution
3.04  The firm  may substitute  away from the  use of the  poorly  provided
service  by adjusting  its  mode of production  in favor  of those  inputs  and raw
materials  which  are  less  infrastructure  intensive. For  example,  if  a firm  has
a choice  between  a labor  intensive  and  a capital  intensive  process  and  if the
labor  intensive  process  relies  less  on  infrastructure  than  the  capital  intensive
one,  the  firm's  strategy  would  be to  substitute  labor  for  capital  thus  reducing
the  quantity  of  infrastructure  inputs.  The  various  private  provision  activities
with large  capital  expenditures  undertaken  by the  Nigerian  firms  indicate  that
their  ability  to adjust  to the  relative  prices  of labor,  machines,  materials,
or  various  infrastructure  service  inputs  is rather  constrained  by the  current
technologies  in  use.  Since  such  input  substitution  possibilities  are  limited,- 12 -
the  firms  operate  inefficiently  by  providing  their  own  infrastructure  services
when chese  are crucial  for their  operations. In case of a milk processing
plant,  for  example,  even if the  public  power  supply  were available  at proper
voltage  for as much as 90 percent  of the time,  the firm could  not afford  to
eliminate  its own generators  with 100 percent  capacity  because  any voltage
surges  and drops at a  crt.tical  time would threaten  key equipment  in the
production  process  and  result  in  much  waste.
C.  Private  Provision
3.05  As  lready  mentioned,  numerous  strategies  are  available  for  the  firms
to  provide  their  own  infrastructure  services. The  fact  that  the  vast  majority
of firms  do so even when the publicly  provided  infrastructure  services  are
extremely  inexpensive, iLLdicates  the  importance  of  having  reliable
infrastructural  inputs.  Private  provision  as a strategy  is not entirely
separate from  factor substitution.  In  fact, by  providing their own
infrastructural  services,  firms  are substituting  internal  capital  in the  form
of equipment,  machinery  as  well as labor  in the  form  of maintenance  personnel
for  the  publicly  provided  infrastructure  services  which  are  not forthcoming.
As  documented  in  Anas  and  Lee  (1988),  Nigerian  firms  are  observed  to  pursue  four
different  private  response  strategies.  These  are:
(a)  Self-sufficiency:  The  firm provides its own  infrastructural
services  to the  point  where  it  does  not  need  ary  public  inputs.
For  example,  Table  Al (in  the  Appendix)  shows  that  only  5  out  of
the  179  surveyed firms are  in this mode with  respect to
electricity  generation.
(b)  Standby  private  provision:  The firm  has its  own infrastructural
facilities  in place  and switches  to these  facilities  when the
quality  or reliability  of the public services  falls  below a
critical  level. From  Table  Al,  140  firms  or 78  percent  of those
surveyed  are  in  this  situation  with respect  to  power  supply.
(c)  Public  source  as standby:  The firm relies  primarily  on its  own
facilities  but  switches  to the  public  supply  during  those  times
of  the  day  when  the  public  source  delivers  a  high  quality  service.
Again,  from  Table  Al, twenty  firms  or about 11 percent  of the
surveyed  firms  reported  such  behavior.
(d)  Captivity:  The firm continues  to rely on the public source
exclusively  despite  the  very low  reliability  of such  a service.
It is reasonable  to expect  that  captivity  will be the  dominant
mode  among  the  very  small  firms  who  cannot  afford  infrastructural
capital  investments.  Only  14  or  7.8  percent  of  the  surveyed  firms
reported  such  behavior  in the  case  of electricity.
3.06  Anas and Lee (1988)  argued  that there  are economic  incentives  for
three  additional  regimes  of  private  provision  which  are  not  observed  in  Nigeria
because  of government  regulations  on the  supply  and trading  of infrastructure
services  by private  entities. These  regimes  are:  (i)  joint  production;  (ii)- 13  -
satellite  behavior;  and  (iii)  shared  production. "Joint  production"  refers  to
the case where a  firm, typically  a  large one, which has already  made a
substantial  investment  in infrastructural  capital  finds  it  profitable  to sell
part of its infrastructural  output  to other  firms. With few  exceptions,  this
has nct been possible  in electricity  production  in Nigeria,  because  private
producters  of  electricity  are  not  normally  allowed  to  sell  surplus  power  to  other
firms  or  even  back to  NEPA. "Satellite  behavior"  is  the  other  side  of the  coin
with respect  to joint  production. A satellite  firm is one which purchases
infrastructure  services  from another firm that has surplus infrastructure
services  to  sell. At times  of  power  interruption,  for  example,  a  satellite  firm
would  switch  from  NEPA  to  the  generators  of  a  nearby  private  producer. "Shared
production"  refers  to the  possibility  of firms  coming  together  in a club  type
of arrangement  called "utility  pool" to share the cost of infrastructural
capital  inputs  by  building  their  own  facilities.  (A  theoretical  framework  for
the  club  type  arrangement  is  in  McGuire,  1974.) The  above  typology  of private
provision  alternatives  is applicable  to all five infrastructure  subsectors
considered  in this  study.
D.  OutRut  Reduction
3.07  This  response  to infrastructural  deficiencies  is  also  common. Firms
which are captive  or use their  own standby  equipment  are subject  to output
reduction  either  on  a  regular  basis  or  when  their  own  equipment  fails  to  operate
properly. However,  the  chief  impact  of output  reduction  necessarily  falls  on
small  firms  which  find  it too  expensive  to  pursue  another  response,  or on  very
large  power  intensive  firms  which  cannot  find  appropriate  size  equipment  (e.g.
generators)  to meet their  service  needs.  It is  difficult  to observe,  but it
undoubtedly  happens  that  many small  firms  in  Nigeria  have either  shut  down  or
have  failed to  grow  to  any  critical size because of  infrastructural
deficiencies.  Also,  births  of  new  firms  will  be reduced  if  many  must  shut  down
soon  after  birth  because  of infrastructural  inadequacies.- 14 .
IV.  COSTS  OF PRIVATE  PROVISION
A.  CaDital  Costs  and  Their  Incidence
4.01  The firms  that  we have surveyed  provide  a telling  story  of the
incidence  of  privato  provision  which  is  by far  the  most  dominant  response  among
Nigerian  manufacturers.  Tables  All  through  A17  in  the  Appendix  show  the  average
current  market  values  of  various  equipment  and  facilities  used  for  own  service
provisions  and their  share of the total  value of the firm's  machinery  and
equipment  for  production. In Table  1,  which  summarizes  the  findings,  we find
that  the  capital  value  of  generators  and  support  facilities  such  as  the  switches
and  transformers  is on the  average  25  percent  of the total  value  of machinery
and  equipment  for  small  firms  (with  less  than  50  employees)  and  10  percent  for
large  firms. This  share  varies  widely  across  the  five  states  and  by firm  sizes,
from  4  percent  for  large  firms  in  Imo  to  36  percent  for  small  firms  in  Anambra.
The  average  value  of capital  for  electricity  generation  including  all firms  is
954,000  naira (about  130,000  U.S. dollars). This  value is almost  four  times
larger  than the  share  of capital  for  boreholes  and treatment  facilities.  The
average  value  is 260,000  naira  for  all  firms  with  boreholes  (Table  A12),  which
is  about  2 percent  of the  total  value  of  machinery  and  equipment. This share
value  varies  from  0.5  percent  in Kano  to 2.1  percent,  or six times  higher,  in
Lagos. Although  water  supply  takes  up a much smaller  share  of equipment  and
machinery  than  does  electricity,  the  share  is  again  higher  for  small  firms  than
it  is for  large  ones,  by about  50  percent.
4.02  From  Table  A13,  although  only  about  15  percent  of the  firms  provide
transport  for their  workers,  the share of these  vehicles  in total capital
equipment  is 5.5  percent  for  small  firms  and  just  under  2.8  percent  for  large
firms.  The low ratio  of self-provision  observed  in transporting  one's own
workers  mean that,  at least  in  Lagos,  a great  deal  of production  time  is lost
because  of the  late  arrival  of  workers. When  firms  choose  not  to  make  capital
expenditures  for their  own provision  of certain  services,  they often incur
comparable  costs  in  other  forms  such  as  in  lost  production  time. In  Lagos,  long
commuting  time  is  not  due  to  the  distances  between  residences  and  workplaces  but
due  to  long  waiting  times  for  buses. Savings  from  employing  workers  with  lower
wages  are limited  by the  firms'  inability  to  get  them  to the  factory  on time.
In the  shipment  of  goods  (Table  A14)  63  percent  of  the  surveyed  firms  had  their
own  vehicles. These  vehicles  make  up 11  percent  of total  capital  equipment  for
small  firms  but  only  slightly  more  than  4  percent  for  large  firms. The  average
capital  value of these  vehicles  was 387,000  naira for each firm.  Capital
expenditures  such  as radio  equipment  (Table  A16)  and  motorcycles  for  couriers
are  small  compared  to  generators  and  boreholes,  but  returns  to  these  investments
are  extremely  high. About  37  percent  of  the  firms  have  radio  equipment  and  its
share  in  the  total  value  of  machinery  and  equipment  is  nearly  three  times  higher
for  small  firms. On the  average,  managers  spend  more  than  10  hours  per  week  on
the  road (Figure  8  and  Table  A8)  to  deliver  messages  or  hold  conversations  that
could  be  handled  in  moments  over  a  working  phone  line.- 15 -
Table  1:  VALUES  OF PRIVATE  INFRASTRUCTURE  PROVISIOIi  AS PERCENT
OF TOTAL  VALUE  OF  MACHINERY  AND  EQUIPMENT
(Percent)
Private  Provision  Small  Firms  m/  Large  Firms  Total
Generators  24.78  10.06  10.42
Boreholes  2.81  1.91  1.91
Vehicles  for  Workers  5.49  2.84  2.86
Vehicles  for  Shipments  10.95  4.47  4.62
of  Goods
Vehicles  for  Garbage  0.15  0.48  0.48
Disposal
Radio  Equipment  1.48  0.59  0.59
Note:  The  values  of  generators,  boreholes,  and  radio  equipment  are  included  in
the  total  values  of  machit.ery  and  equipment,  but  those  of  vehicles  are  not
included.
a/  Establishments  with  less  than  50  employees.
Source:  Table  All through  Table  A17 in  the  Appendix.- 16 -
B.  The  Private  Cost  as  A Measure  of
Willingness  to Pay  for  Reliable  Services
4.03  As documented  in the  above  section,  manufacturers  incur  high  capital
cost  in  installing  own  facilities  for  providing  their  own  services.  In  the  case
of electric  power  generation,  the  survey  reveals  that  nearly  all  standby  firms
have installed  capacity  sufficient  to run  the  entire  plant  during  a period  of
NEPA  power interruption.  The  data also indicates  that  the sample  firms  as a
whole 25 percent  of all power  used  by them  during  1987  came from their  own
generators  and 75  percent  from  NEPA.  (The  breakdown  by firm  size is shown  in
Figure 9.)  Because the typical  installed  private generation  capacity is
approximately  sufficient  to run the entire plant (with some reserve for
maintenance),  this means that about 75 percent  of the generation  c:apacity
remains  idle. This idle  capacity  results  in  extremely  high total  average  cost
of  private  power  generation  as shown  below. The  high  cost  of  private  provision
sustained  by the firms  is the  implicit  value  of service  reliability  that  the
firms  are  willing  to  pay for. A precise  measure  of  willingness  to pay  can  be
determined  by calculating  the  average  cost  (per  kWh)  of electricity  produced  by
the  firr.s  own  generators  (as  the  lower  bound). When the  average  cost  of the
privately  produced  power is higher than the price charged by NEPA, the
difference  between  these  two  gives  the  premium  which  manufacturers  are  willing
to incur  in  order  to insure  themselves  of an  uninterrupted  power  supply  at  all
times.
4.04  Tables  2  and  3  show  two  such  sets  of computations  on  the  average  cost
of  private  power  generation.  Table  2  shows  the  average  cost  computed  using  each
firm's  reported  power  consumption  from  own  generators  during  1987  for  different
firm size categories  (25.48  percent  of the total  consumption  for the sample
firms as a whole).  Thus, these figures  reflect  the cost of holding idle
generating  capacity.  Table 3  shows the average cost of electric power
generation  for  different  firm  size  categories  assuming  that  100  percent  of  power
supply  comes  from  own  generators.  In  both  Tables  2  and  3, the  capital  recovery
cost is computed  by annualizing  the current market value of  the firm's
generators  and accessories  using the  remaining  service  life.  The recurring
costs  of  fuel,  maintenance,  and  labor,  are  added  to  the  capital  cost  (see  Table
A18 for  this  cost  breakdown). In Table  3, these  reported  recurring  costs  are
appropriately  adjusted  for  the  full  utilization  case  as explained  in footnote
(a)  to  Table  3. The  average  cost  schedule  by firm  size  has  been  calculated  with
different  sets  of assumptions  on (i)  the real  rate of interest  and (ii)  the
exchange  rate.  In  our  discussion  below,  we refer  to  the  average  cost  schedule
computed  with the  10  percent  real interest  rate  and  the  current  exchange  rate
of 7.5  Naira  per  US dollars. (During  the  1980s  the  average  inflation  rate  was
about  12  percent  and  the  current  commercial  lending  rate  is  about  20  percent.)
4.05  Table 2 shows that at the actual  average  utilization  rate of 25
percent  of the generatirg  capacity,  the average  cost per kWh is 4.61  Naira,
which is 66 times  the  present  NEPA price  of 7 kobos!  Suppose  that the  NEPA
tariff  were to  be adjusted  to 30  kobos,  a rate  currently  charged  by a private
supplier  in  Lagos  (para.  5.08). The average  firm  would  still  be incurring  15
times  the  new NEPA  price  at the  actual  utilization  rate of 25 percent.  Even- 17  -
under  the  assumption  of  100  percent  supply  from  own  generators,  the  average  cost
of 1.41  Naira  for  all  firms  (Table  3)  will  be five  times  higher  than  NEPA's  30
kobos.  The  premium  is  highest  for  the  20-49  person  firm  size  category  with a
factor  of 6 while  for  the  largest  size  category  of 1,000  or more  persons  the
premium  is  a factor  of only  1.3. Small  firms  pay for  a  higher  premium  because
of  economies  of  scale  in  electric  power  generation.  From  the  20-49  person  firm
size  category  the  average  cost  declines  exponentially  with the  firm  size. The
cost schedules  in Tables  2 and 3  have  been fitted  to semi-log  and double-log
regressions  as  reported in Table  4.  The  slope coefficients  are  all
statistically  significant.  The  average  cost  values  shown  in  Tables  2 and  3  are
plotted in Figures 10 (excluding  the values for firms  with less than 20
employees).
4.06  The premium  paid by firms  varies  with firm size.  Such variation
should  be a central  concern  in the design  of appropriate  policies  for  both
efficiency  and  equity  reasons. The  smallest  group  with  less  than  20  employees
shows  an average  cost  that  is  lower  than  the  sample  mean.  This  is  not  because
they  can  generate  electric  power  at lower  cost  however. Rather  it is  because
they  cannot  afford  to  make  the  expensive  capital  investment  to  meet  the  required
power  need. They  may  be able  to generate  enough  power  to support  the  lighting
and  other  critical  elements.
4.07  The  evidence  of the  presence  of economies  of scale  in  electric  power
generation  is  clear  from  the  20-49  size  category  as  mentioned  above. The  cost
of  producing  100  percent  of  power  supply  from  the  installed  generating  capacity
falls  by a  factor  of  4.4 (from  1.752  to  0.399  in  Table  3)  as  firm  size  increases
from  "20-49"  to "1,000  and  over." When  the  cost  of idle  capacity  is included,
the  average  cost  in  the  same  range  of firm  sizes  falls  by only  a factor  of 1.9
(from  6.457  to 3.315  in Table  2).  Since  large  firms  can achieve  great  scale
economies  when  their  capital  intensive  equipment  is  fully  utilized,  the  fall  in
average  cost is higher  in the case of fuller  utilization. From the above
analysis,  we can  conclude  that  the  premium  over  the  NEPA  price  declines  with  an
increase  in  firm  size  and  that  even  after  a  hypothetical  tariff  increase  to 30
kobos  per  kWh,  the  fuller  utilization  case  premiums  would  still  be larger  than
the  NEPA  price  for  all  firm  sizes. Of the  average  total  cost  of  4.61  naira  in
the case of underutilization,  the average  variable  cost is 80 kobos for the
sample  firms  as  a  whole  (Table  5). A  NEPA  price  of  30  kobos  will  be only  about
a third  of the  average  variable  cost  of self-generation.  In some  developed
countries,  gas turbine  generators  are widely  used and they do not manifest
economies  of scale.  This technology  is seldom  used in Nigeria  as yet.  The
minimum  size  for  gas  turbine  generators  however  is likely  to  be too  large  for
the  need  of most  individual  firms.Figure  9:  PROPORTION OF ELECTRIC POWER SUPPLY
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Table  2: AVERAGE  COST  OF ELECTRIC  POWER  GENERATION  BY FIRM  SIZE:
UNDERUTILIZATION  CASE  a/
Average  Cost
Firm  Size  (Naira/kWh)
Interest
Rate b/  5-gercent  10  percent  15  percent
(1987  exchange  rate  US$1-4.0  Naira)
All  Firms  2.540  2.834  3.150
0-9  0.374  0.426  0.483
10-19  0.698  0.781  0.871
20-49  3.336  3.740  4.171
50-99  2.698  3.009  3.346
100-199  2.573  2.936  3.328
200-499  2.357  2.564  2.7d0
500-999  1.442  1.611  1.793
1000  & Over  2.327  2.439  2.556
(1989  exchange  rate  US$1-7.5  Naira)  _q/
All  Firms  4.061  4.612  5.204
0-9  0.634  0.732  0.838
10-19  1.086  1.243  1.412
20-49  5.701  6.457  7.267
50-99  4.191  4.775  5.407
100-199  4.196  4.876  5.611
200-499  3.718  4.106  4.519
500-999  2.063  2.379  2.721
1000  & Over  3.105  3.315  3.534
a/  The  average  utilization  of installed  generating  capacity  was  25.48%.
h/  Interest  rates  represent  hypothetical  real  rates.
c/  Adjusted  for  the  values  of generators  and  accessories  only.
Source: NIDB/IBRD  Project  Establishment  Survey  1988.- 20 -
Table 3:  AVERAGE COST OF ELECTRIC  POWER GENERATION BY FIRM SIZE:
FULL UTILIZATION CASE  M/
Average Cost
Firm Size  (Naira/kWh)
Interest
Rate  b/  5 percent  10 percent  15 percent
(1987  exchange rate US$1.00-4.0 Naira)
All Firms  0.959  1.021  1.086
0-9  0.143  0.155  0.169
10-19  0.435  0.463  0.493
20-49  1.101  1.180  1.263
50-99  1.045  1.122  1.206
100-199  1.023  1.091  1.163
200-499  1.018  1.060  1.104
500-999  0.675  0.712  0.752
1000 & Over  0.314  0.326  0.339
(1989  exchange rate US$1.00-7.5 Naira)  ./
All Firms  1.291  1.407  1.530
0-9  0.205  0.228  0.253
10-19  0.568  0.621  0.677
20-49  1.606  1.752  1.908
50-99  1.380  1.525  1.682
100-199  1.444  1.572  1.708
200-499  1.243  1.322  1.406
500-999  0.821  0.890  0.966
1000 & Over  0.376  0.399  0.423
.A/ Assumed 100% of electric power supply  comes from own generators.  Fuel
consumption and maintenance  cost are adjusted accordingly: Fuel by a factor
of  4 and maintenance  and  parts  by 3,  when the  utilization  rate increases  from
25% to 100%.
_/ Interest rates represent  hypothetical real rates.
£/ Adjusted for the values of generators and accessories  only.
Source:  NIDB/IBRD Project Establishment Survey 1988.- 21 -
Table 4: REGRESSION OF AVERAGE COST OF ELECTRIC POWER  GENERATION ON FIRM SIZE
Semi-log  Double-log
5% a/  10%  15%  5j  10%  15%
Full Utilization Case hi
Constant  -0.172  -0.095  -0.005  1.153  1.323  1.432
(1.50)  (0.83)  (0.04)  (2.41)  (2.77)  (3.06)
Slope  -0.000619  -0.000625  -0.000636  -0.306  -0.325  -0.328
(3.25)  (3.26)  (3.39)  (3.19)  (3.39)  (3.49)
R2  0.0669  0.0670  0.0720  0.0649  0.0721  0.0761
N  149 ./  150  150  149  150  150
Underutilization  Case d/
Constant  0.646  0.773  0.870  1.629  1.830  1.921
(4.89)  (5.86)  (6.46)  (2.95)  (3.33)  (3.41)
Slope  -0.000503  -0.000522  -0.000513  -0.229  -0.246  -0.244
(2.30)  (2.39)  (2.29)  (2.07)  (2.23)  (2.16)
R2 0.0355  0.0379  0.0349  0.0289  0.0332  0.0310
N  146  147  148  146  147  148
Note:  The  dependent  variable  is  the  log  of  the  averagd  cost  in  Naira  per kWh.  The  value  of capital  was
calculated  using  the  current  exchange  rate  of  US$1.00-  7.5  Naira.  The  independent  variable  is  the  total
number  of employees  in  the semi-log  case  and  the  log  of the total  number  of employees  in the  double
log  case.  Establishments  with  less  than  20 employees  are  not included  in  the  regressions.
a/  Interest  rates  represent  hypothetical  real  rates.
bt  Assumed  100%  of  electric  power  supply  comes  from  own  generators.  Fuel  consumption  and  maintenance  cost
are  adjusted  accordingly:  Fuel  by a  factor  of 4  and  maintenance  and  parts  by 3,  when  the  utilization
rate  increases  from  25X  to 100l.
cI  The  total  number  of  observations  may  not  be  the  same  because  the  log  of  negatlve  values  is  not  defined
and  they  are  treated  as  missing  values.
d/  The  average  utiliration  rate  of installed  generating  capacity  was  25.482.
Source: NIDB/IBRD  Project  Establishment  Survey  1988- 22  -
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Table  5:  AVERAGE  FIXED AND  VARIABLE  COSTS OF OWIN  ELECTRIC  POWER  GENERATION  PER KWH
Firm  Size  Fixed  Cost  s/  Variable  Cost  k/  Total
All  Firms  (Naira)  3.810  0.803  4.612
(Percent)  82.60  17.40  100.00
0-9  0,655  0.077  0.732
89.50  10.50  100.00
10-19  0.990  0.253  1.243
79.62  20.38  100.00
20-49  5.824  0.634  6.457
90.19  9.81  100.00
50-99  3.784  0.991  4.775
79.24  20.76  100.00
100-199  4.157  0.719  4.876
85.26  14.74  100.00
200-499  3.305  0.801  4.106
80.49  19.51  100.00
500-999  1.646  0.733  2.379
69.19  30.81  100.00
1000  & Over  1.877  1.438  3.315
56.62  43.38  100.00
Note:  For the  smaple  firms  as a  whole,  25.48  percent  of electric  power  supply
came  from  own  generators.
a/  Annualized  capital  value  of generators  and  accessories.
hi  Include  fuel,  maintenance,  parts,  and  labor.
Source:  Table  A18.- 24 -
V.  DEVELOPING  POLICY  OPTIONS  FOR  IMPROVING  SERVICE  PROVISION
5.01  As explained  in the introduction,  in Nigeria  two  extreme  cases  of
inefficiency  in  the  provision  of infrastructural  services  are  observed: First,
the  non-performing  public  sector  with  heavy  capital  investments; Second,  the
costly  provision  of  services  by individual  firms  themselves.  The  self-provision
response  has  developed  over  the  years  because  of  non-performance  in the  public
sector. Without  the  extensive  private  provision  responses,  the  total  welfare
loss  resulting  from  the  public  secLir  failures  would  have  been  much  higher  in
Nigeria.
5.02  At best, public sector  performance  is likely to improve  very
gradually.  In addition,  improvements  in public sector  performance  will be
accompanied  by considerable  upward  adjustment  in pricing  and tariffs.  Such
adjustments  which  a:e  necessary  for long  run  efficiency  however  are bound  to
create  hardships  in  the  short  run,  as firms  of  all  sizes  and  in  all  sectors  and
regions  make their  own adjustments. For these  reasons,  the correct  policy
perspective  for Nigeria is not to  stress improvements  in public sector
performance  to the exclusion  of private sector incentives.  Rather, the
challenge  is  to  find  feasible  intermediate  term  policy  options  which  bridge  the
gap  between  the  above  mentioned  two  extreme  cases  of inefficiency,  namely,  the
nonperforming  public  sector  and  costly  private  provision  by individual  firms.
5.03  As discussed  in  Anas  and  Lee  (1988),  there  are  numerous  opportunities
that  can  be exploited  for  strengthening  those  already  existing  markets  for  the
private  supply  of infrastructure  services  or creating  new ones such that  the
costs  of  private  provision  are  significantly  reduced  and  more  efficient  private
provision  alternatives  are  offered. Policy  options  can  be grouped  into  three
categories: (i) regulatory  changes  which  will induce  fuller  utilization  of
existing  private  provision  capacities;  (ii)  private  sector  participation  in
selected  subactivities;  and  (iii)  changes  in  pricing  and  tariff  structures.  We
will discuss  below  each of these  policy  areas  as illustrations  for possible
policy options drawing on  the  survey results.  More  definitive  policy
recommendations  will be made later in the study  based on formal  empirical
analyses  to  be conducted.
A.  Regulatory  Changes  for  Fuller  Utilization  of Private  Provision  CaDacities
5.04  Some  minor  regulatory  changes  can  generate  significant  benefits  to
individual  firms. As noted  earlier,  most firms  have standby  generators  which
stay  idle  about  75  percent  of  the  time. These  firms  however  are  not  allowed  to
sell  the  excess  power  they  produce  to  NEPA or to other  firms.  The  potential
cost savings from allowing  such transactions  can be large.  The current
regulations  inhibit  the  regimes  of  "joint  production",  "satellite  behavior",  and
"shared  production"  which  were  discussed  in  Chapter  III (para.  3.06). Indeed,
the  efficiency  gains  of allowing  large  firms  with a high level  of installed
capacity  to exploit  fully  their  scale  economies  and to compete  with NEPA  by
supplying  smalle. satellite  firms could be significant.  The presence  of- 25 -
economies  of scale was shown in Chapter IV in the case of electric  power
generation.
5.05  Such regulatory  changes  could  also motivate  "shared  production"
whereby  private  manufacturers  join forces  to form certain  types of "utility
pools" to exploit economies  of  scale in the provision of each type of
infrastructural  service  and economies  of scope in the provision  of several
different  infrastructural  services  at the  same  time.  Utility  pools  should  be
quite  feasible  in  the  existing  industrial  estates  or in  areas  with  a  relatively
high concentration  of industries. The participation  of large  firms in the
infrastructure  production  process  and competition  with the public  suppliers
broadens  the choices  available  to small firms and especially  the "captive
firms." Small  firms  in such  an environment  can  become  satellite  firms  or can
join in utility  pools.  As shown in Chapter  IV, small  f'rms  have very high
willingness  to pay for reliable  alectric  power  supply.  Thus, they  would  be
motivated  to  join  a  utility  pool  or to  become  satellites  to larger  firms.
5.06  A good  example  of a "utility  pool"  in  place  is the  central  effluent
collection  and treatment  facility  in the Agbara  Industrial  Estate  which  was
established  by a private  developer. This central  facility  is operated  by a
management  company. As the  government  attempts  to  tighten  industrial  pollution
control,  treating  the  effluent  within  individual  firms  would  be prohibitively
expensive,  especially  for small  firms.  Similarly,  in industrial  layouts  in
Lagos,  the  central  collection  and  treatment  of  effluent  by the  management  board
should  be technically  feasible  and will induce  economies  of scale.  Such a
management  board could  be further  empowered  to operate  and manage "utility
pools"  which  include  a  wide  range  of  services  such  as  electric  power  generation,
garbage  collection,  and the  shipment  of goods.  Another  example  of a central
facility  in place  is the  six  megawatt  standby  generator  of the  University  of
Ibadan  which  serves  the  entire  campus. A  note  prepared  for  a  recent  Industrial
Sector  Study  (Lee,  1989b)  further  discusses  such  possibilities  for  the  existing
industrial  areas  in  Nigeria.
B.  Private  Sector  Participation  in  Contestable  Markets  for  the  SupRly
of Infrastructure  Related  Services
5.07  Although more efficient  pricing  systems  combined  with appropriate
relaxation  of  regulatory  constraints  can  be introduced  to  induce  improved  public
sector  performance  and to minimize  the adverse  impacts of infrastructural
deficiencies on  manufacturers,  these  strategies alone  are  unlikely to
significantly  improve  the  current  situation  in the short  run or even in the
medium term, because of  the various x-inefficiencies  in  administration,
financial  management,  and  the  operation  and  maintenance  practices  of  the  public
agencies. Based  on  what  is  observed  in  Nigeria,  a  sensible  way  of  breaking  this
inertia  seems  to  be the  encouragement  of  private  sector  participation  in  various
infrastructure  related  functions  and  subactivities.
5.08  Indeed,  in Nigeria  we observe  that some  private  firms  are already
engaged  in certain  types  of infrastructure  related  subactivities. Recently,
NEPA began  subcontracting  certain segments of  its  operations, such as
maintenance  for  a power  station  and  transmission  facilities,  to  private  firms.- 26 -
Many foreign firms including  Siemens  and ITT have already  had maintenance
contracts  with the  Nigerian  Telephone  Company  (NITEL). The  government  allowed
a  private  firm,  DHL,  to  operate  in  Nigeria. DHL  charges  a  much  higher  fee  than
the  NigeLian  Postal  Service,  but it is faster  and  more reliable,  and thriving
with good  business. This is additional  evidence  that  users  of services  have
high degrees  of willingness  to pay when reliable  services  become  available.
This  was  also  observed  in  the  Haroko  low  income  area  in  Victoria  Island. This
area,  which  NEPA never  included  in its  network,  has been served  by a private
entrepreneur  who charges  30 kobos per kWh, four times  higher  than NEPA's  7
kobos.  But this  rate  of 30 kobos  is still  many times  lower  than  the  average
cost  of  own  power  generation  as  shown  in  Chapter  IV. Another  example  is  the  air
freight  and passenger transport  sector.  In this area, a number  of small
privately  owned  domestic  airlines  provide  stiff  competition  to  Nigerian  Airways
because  they  supply  more  reliable  service.  Railroads,  where  the  high  sunk  costs
associated  with the capital  facilities  make the industry  less contestable,
cannot  as  easily  benefit  from  such  private  competition,  but  trucking  has  emerged
as  a very  viable  alternate  transport  mode.
5.09  In Nigeria,  a broad continuum  of opt..ons  exist  between the two
extremes  of  inefficiency  characterized  above.  These  options  amount  to  providing
incentives  for private entrepreneurs  to engage in the supply of certain
infrastructure  services,  thus creating  appropriate  market  mechanisms.  Such
markets can be  specialized  to  infrastructural  services in the areas of
production,  distribution,  maintenance,  administration,  metering  and  monitoring,
or  bill  collection.  The  feasibility  of  creating  and  expanding  such  markets  for
the  supply  of these  services  by the  private  sector  lies in the fact  that the
government  fails  to  provide  adequate  services  whereas  the  users  are  willing  to
pay for more reliable  services  when such are available  as demonstrated  in
Chapter  IV for  the  case  of electric  power  supply.
5.10  A  recent Bank case study by Whittington,  Lauria and Mu  (1989)
documents  how high  willingness  to  pay for  water  has led  to the  emergence  of a
complex  web of private  market  mechanisms  for  water  distribution  in  Onitsha,  a
Nigerian  town  of 700,000. In  this  town,  the  private  sector  operates  about  275
tanker  trucks  which  purchase  water  from  about  20  privately  owned  boreholes  and
sell  it  to  businesses  and  households  with  storage  tanks.  Many  of the  households
purchasing  such  water in turn sell  it to individuals  who are  not ,quipped  to
store  in  large  quantities,  or  to  thousands  of  small  mobile  private  vendors.  The
private  vendors  provide  two times  more  water  on the  aggregate  compared  to the
public  utility  and  collect  10  times  the  revenue  in  rainy  season  and  24  times  the
revenue  in dry season.  Households  pay these  private  vendors  over twice  the
operations  and maintenance  costs  of piped  water,  a strong  indication  of the
willingness  to  pay  for  reliability,  and  clear  evidence  of the  private  sector's
ability  to  compete  with the  public  sector.
5.11  To  operationalize  a  workable framework for  promoting private
participation  in the infrastructure  subsectors,  the following  strategies  in
three  key  areas  need  to  be considered.- 27 -
Regulatory  regimes  and  market  mechanisms
5.12  The  first  step  is  to  improve  the  present  regulatory  regimes  to  provide
a more favorable  environment  for  private  investors  so that  they  can  enter  the
market  for  a specific  service  and  offer  alternative  sources  of supply. Many  of
the  public sector failures in  Nigeria stem  from  the  fact  that most
infrastructure  services are  provided by  strongly centralized  government
monopolies.  As discussed  in  Anas  and  Lee (1988),  however,  even  some  services
which have the characteristics  of public goods can be supplied  with the
participation  of the  private  sector  (also  see  Roth,  1985). To the  extent  that
the  markets  for  certain  infrastructural  services  are  contestable  (Baumol,  Panzar
and  Willig,  1982)  because  there  are  no large  sunk costs  involved  in capital
facilities,  it  should  be feasible  to liberalize  restrictions  against  the  setup
and  operation  (entry  and  exit)  of priv-ate  firms.
5.13  There are a number of situations  where such a  strategy  can be
successful.  A  good example  is the utility  pool already  discussed  above.
Individual  firms  in  a  pool  may  prefer  to  have  a  private  infrastructure  provider
who  will  manage  and  operate  a  pool  with shared  facilities  such  as  vehicles  and
waste  collection  equipment.  This  would  allow  the  pool  to  take  advantage  of the
economies  of scale and scope,  as well as to pass the transaction  costs of
administration  and  management to  the private entrepreneur  who  would be
self-financing  by levying  charges  on the  pool  members.
5.14  As mentioned  ear3ier,  power generation  is an area where  private
participation  can  be greatly  increased  by allowing  private  entrepreneurs  to set
up  power  plants  which  compete  with  NEPA. A  successful  arrangement  exists  at  Jos
where  a  privately  owned  power  plant  which  was  setup  in  colonial  times  has  been
allowed  to  operate. This  firm  supplies  much  of  the  local  power  needs  and  sells
its  excess  power to NEPA.  Additional  private  power  providers  are likely  to
emerge  throughout  Nigeria  if  the  existing  regulatory  constraints  were  relaxed.
If this  were to happen,  NEPA could  stiffen  its  tariff  structure  since  users
would  have  the  freedom  to  switch  to  the  private  suppliers.  NEPA's  transmission
and  distribution  grids  should  be  made  accessible  to  such  private  power  companies
which  can  be required  to  pay  appropriate  access  fees  which  reflect  the  marginal
costs  of serving  them.  Allowing  access  to the  grids  makes  the  generation  of
power  a contestable  activity  which  greatly  increases  the  incentive  for  private
participation. The levying  of efficient  access  fees  by NEPA  would  provide  a
source  of  revenue  which  aids  in  cost  recovery  while  reducing  some  of  NEPA's  own
power  generation  costs. This  approach  has  been  followed  in  Britain  with  respect
to  both  the  power  authority  (Henney,  1987)  and  British  Telecom  (Beesley,  1981).
A wide range of options for private sector participation  have also been
considered  in the  past.  These  include,  for  example,  farming  out  distribution
functions  to  private  firms  (World  Bank,  1983b;  Coyaud,  1986).
Organizational  and institutional  mechanisms
5.15  To induce  the  development  of  appropriato  market  mechanisms  for  private
sector  participation  in infrastructure  supply,  it  will be necessary  to allow
appropriate  institutional  arrangements  such  as subcontracting  or franchising  to
carry  out a particular  type  of infrastructural  service. Such  mechanisms  will- 28 -
tend  to  vary  from  sector  to  sector  and  will  depend  on the  strength  of incentives
which  are  needed  and  the  efficiency  gains  which  will  occur  from  private  sector
participation.
5.16  A good  illustration  is  available  in  the  waste  collection  and  disposal
subsector  in  Nigeria  where  a  number  of  alternative  institutional  responses  have
been  observed  in  recent  years  (Sulu,  1987). While  Lagos  approached  the  problem
of solid  waste  disposal  by authorizing  large  capital  expenditures  (World  Bank,
1985),  Ibadan  implemented  a citizen  participation  procedure  in which private
firms  haul their garbage to designated  points to be picked  up by private
licensed  subcontractors  or  by the  public  sector. In  Owerri  the  solution  was to
enter into a  subcontract  with the German firm SULO A.G., which made an
unsolicited  offer.
5.17  Luger  (1989)  in  a recent  World  Bank  discussion  brief  argues  for  more
private  sector  participation  in solid  waste  collection  in the Lagos  area to
increase  its share of industrially  generated  waste up from the current 7
percent.  Luger breaks down solid waste collection into the  following
subactivities:  (i)  pickup  at the source  and delivery  to processing  plant or
transfer  station;  (ii) pickup at processing  plant or transf'r  station  and
delivery  to  tipping  site  or  resource  recovery  facilities;  (iii)  transfer  points,
tipping  sites,  processing  facilities,  or incinerators;  (iv) maintenance  of
various  facilities;  and  (v)  administration  including  bill  collection.  While  the
Lagos  State  Waste  Disposal  Board  (LSWDB)  could  continue  to  maintain  control  over
regulation,  the remaining ;ubactivities  are candidates  for  various forms  of
privatization  on a case  by case  basis.  For  example,  the  private  sector  could
be induced  to  set  up landfill  sites  or resource  recovery  facilities  if  they  are
allowed  to produce  gas,  energy,  or compost  which  can  be sold  profitably. In
finance,  bill collection  can  be contracted  out,  where  the  contractor's  payment
is  based  on the  percentage  of outstanding  revenues  that  are  collected. Such  a
private  collecting  entity  would  be  more  motivated  than  the  existing  bureaucracy
to achieve full revenue  accrual.  In the areas of pickup  and delivery  to
intermediate  points,  there  is a variety  of available  options  including  dirr-ct
delivery  by the  manufacturing  establishment's  own  vehicles,  pickup  by private
entrepreneurs  on a demand activated  basis, or pickup  by a private entity
licensed  to operate  as a spatial  monopoly  within  a particular  district.
Monitoring  mechanisms  for  market  operations  and  service  quality
5.18  As  various  infrastructure  related  functions  currently  under  government
control  are  decentralized  and  privatized,  it  will  be important  to redefine  the
role  of the  government  for  appropriate  monitoring  and  supervision  of  efficient
market  operations. For example,  if a subactivity  such as bill collection  or
garbage  pickup  is contracted  out to private  firms,  it will be necessary  to
monitor  their  success  with  revenue  collection  or  quality  of service  in  garbage
pickup. Their  contract  renewal  could  be determined  by a periodic  competitive
bidding  process.
5.19  In  sum,  the  government  will  play  an important  role  in  implementing  the
new institutional  setups  resulting  from the  policy  options  and reforms  that
might be adopted.  More systematic  analyses  of economic  and institutional
feasibility  will follow  in  this  study.- 29 -
C.  Congestion.  System  Failures,  and  Pricing  Policy
5.20  The fluctuations  in the  quality  of public  infrastructure  services
observed  in Nigeria  are, in part,  a result  of congestion  in the use of the
system. While  the  demand  for  the  service  from  a public  agency  such  as NEPA  is
a function  of quality,  the quality  itself  is a declining  function  of the
quantity  demanded  due  to  congestion  effects.  The  public  agencies  must  consider
the  trade-offs  between  the  quantity  supplied  and  the  quality  (and  reliability)
of services  in  determining  the  pricing  policy,  especially  in  the  short  run  when
the  ability  to  expand  the  system  is  limited.  Treating  congestion  as  endogenous
is common in transportation  and other urban infrastructure  systems, and
congested  situations  require  the levying  of an optimally  set congestion  toll
which  will reduce  the  load  and  congestion  to  a socially  optimal  level.
5.21  As an illustration,  consider  the  electric  power  pricing  by NEPA. As
indicated  in Chapter  II,  most power  interruptions  (nearly  two thirds)  are a
result  of bottlenecks  on the transmission  and distribution  networks.  It is
commonly  observed  that in the industrial  areas in Lagos  when large  energy
intensive  manufacturing  plants such as  steel mills start operating,  the
resulting  voltage  surge  often  damages  machinery  and  equipment  of smaller  firms
located  in the  vicinity. Large  energy  intensive  firms  place  heavier  loads  on
the  system,  thus  tying  up  more  operable  transmission  capacity. However,  these
large  firms  are  the  ones  which  can  afford  to  have  own  generators,  have  a  greater
amount  of unused  generating  capacity,  and  can  produce  electric  power  at  a much
lower  average  cost  than  small  firms.
5.22  In  the  case  of  NEPA,  the  congestion  is  so  severe  that  the  system  tends
to fail  completely  resulting  in frequent  power  outages. In  such  a situation,
it  would  be desirable  to  raise  the  tariff  to  a sufficiently  high  level  to  clear
the  market. For  example,  at  a  NEPA  tariff  of  50  kobos  per  kWh,  large  firms  may
find  self-generation  cheaper  and  use their  own generators  more fully,  thereby
reducing  congestion.  Deregulation,  to  allow  those  firms  to  sell  excess  power,
should  provide  added  incentives  to own  generation  of power.  Small  firms  will
then  have  better  access  to the system. Public  supply  quality  is expected  to
improve  at the  higher  NEPA  price  which  smaller  users  may find  still  lower  than
the  cost of self-generation.  We have requested  NEPA to provide  us with  the
necessary  data  to document  statistically  the  correlation  between  loads  on the
transmission  network  and the  frequency  of power  failures,  in order  to measure
the  quality  improvements  that  can  be  expected  from  inducing  firms  with  different
private provision  cepacities  to reduce their use of the public supply in
response  to  higher  prices. A more  comprehensive  study  of  the  market  structure,
including  NEPA's  costs  and  variations  in  demand  by user  types  and  locations  is
needed  to determine  the  order  of the  price  that  will  remove  congestion.
5.23  Producing  specific  tariff  systems  for  individual  subsectors  such  as
electric  power,  water,  a-d  telecommunications  is  beyond  the  scope  of  this  study.
In  this  research  project,  however,  we intend  to  quantify  relative  efficiencies
of alternative  pricing  regimes  by simulating  the  responses  of different  types
of firms  to such  regimes  that  reflect  particular  types  of market  structures.
Possibilities  for  considering  variations  of  the  "two-part  tariff",  for  example,
were  discussed  in  detail  in  the  framework  paper  (Anas  and  Lee,  1988). Bahl  and- 30 -
Linn (1989)  present  an excellent  review  of pricing  urban  services. A recent
paper  by Heady  (1988)  stresses  the  role  of  public  sector  prices  as instruments
of cost recovery  and explains  the  Bank's  two-step  practice  in setting  public
sector  prices.  TLa first  step  calculates  the  marginal  cost;  the second  step
adjusts marginal cost to take account of other factors such as revenue
shortfalls,  market  distortions,  and  distributional  effects. All these  factors
are relevant  to the  Nigerian  situation. Another  recent  paper  by Julius  and
Alicbusan  (1988)  documents  the  two-step  approach  in  more  detail  and  surveys  the
use of such  pricing  policies  in  many  countries  and  various  public  sectors. A
clear  discussion  of  short-run  marginal  cost  pricing,  economic  user  charges,  and
budget  deficits  is given  in  Meier (1983,  pp.192-203)  which  is reprinted  from
Walters  (1968)  and  Bennathan  and  Walters  (1979)  who  also  discuss  nonlinear  "two-
part tariff"  pricing.- 31 -
VI.  CONCLUSIONS  AND  FURTHER  EMPIRICAL  STUDY
6.01  The  main  objectives  of this  paper  were  to  document  the  extent,  causes,
and  incidence of  infrastructural  deficiencies  as  they  affect Nigerian
manufacturers;  to  observe the  responses of  the  manufacturers  to  these
deficiencies;  and to develop  viable  policy  options  based  on the observations
from the data collected.  The results  of the establishment  survey  revealed
general  patterns  of deficiencies  and  self-provision  responses  by manufacturers
which  cut  across  all  five  infrastructure  subsectors  included  in the  study. In
particular,  in nearly  all infrastructural  activities,  small  firms  face  higher
unit costs  than larger  firms  do and the patterns  of self-provision  by firms
differ  a great  deal  by region  within  the  country  as  well  as  by type  of firm.
6.02  Our main thrust  in developing  policy  options  is that the ongoing
structural  adjustments  in  Nigeria,  including  changes  in  pricing,  regulation,  and
institutional  structure  in most sectors,  need to  be extended  to managing  and
accommodating  the  costs  of the  widespread  private  provision  of infrastructure
services  resultirng  from  public  sector  failures.  Because  improvements  in  public
sector  performance  are likely  to remain  slow in the short  and intermediate
terms,  manufacturers  and  especially  small  firms  will  continue  to  bear  the  costs
of  self-provision.  Furthermore,  with  the  ongoing  upward  adjustments  in  tariffs
the  burdens  of the  deficiencies  which  are  borne  by small  firms  will increase.
To ease these private  burdens and to improve the overall infrastructural
provision in Nigeria,  we have considered  plausible  policy options in the
following  three  areas:
(a)  Regulatory reforms such  as  the  relaxation of  regulatory
restrictions  against  the  trading  of  infrastructural  services  among
manufacturers.
(b)  Private  sector  participation  in  contestable  markets  for  the  supply
of infrastructural  services,  wherever  appropriate  for selected
subactivities  such  as  production,  delivery,  maintenance,  revenue
collection,  and finance,  by  means of various institutional
mechanisms  such  as subcontracting,  franchising,  and  districting.
(c)  Alternative  pricing  policies  taking  into account  the capacity
limitation  and  congestion  effects  on the  service  facilities.
6.03  A set  of  more  definite  policy  recommendations  will  be provided  later
in  the  study  on the  basis  of  the  formal  empirical  analysis  to  be  conducted  with
the  establishment  survey  data. In  particular,  econometric  work  outlined  in  the
framework  paper  (  Anas  and  Lee, 1988)  and  Verma  and  Lee (1988)  will  enable  us
to  estimate  key  production  and  cost  function  parameters  which  will  provide  firm
quantitative  bases  for  policy  analyses. Such  econometric  models  can  be  used  to
simulate  the responses  of selected  firms to various  policy  changes.  Such
simulations  are  essential  in  order  to  obtain  better  insight  about  the  probable
economic  benefits  that are likely  to result  from the  policy  options  and the
implementation  strategies  which  we have  discussed.- 32  -
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Table  Al:  DISTRIBUTION  OF MANUFACTURING  ESTABLISHMENTS
REGION  BY SOURCE  OF ELECTRICITY
Region
Source  of  Electriety  for  Productio.  Operation  1/
Frequency
Row Pot
Col  Pet  NEPA  I NEPA  |  Own gen.|own  sen 
only  main  I  main  only  I  Total
Lagos  2  68  10  21  82
2-  I  82.93  12.20  2:44  100.00
14.29  48.  -7  50.00  40.00  45.81
AnambraIlmo  12  22  1  1  S36
33.33  1  61.11  2.718  2.78  100.00
85.71  15.71  5.00 I  20.00  20.11 -4.  4.------_  ----  - -------------------- +-------
Kaduna/Kano  0  50  9  2  61
0.00  81.97  14.75  3.28  100.00
0.00  35.71  45.00  40.00  34.08
Total  14  140  20  5  179
7.82  78.21  11.17  2.79  100.00
100.00  100.00  100.00  100.00  100.00
aI NEPA  only-using  1001  from  PEPA;  NEPA  main-NEPA  as  the  main  source  and  own  generators
as standby. Own  sen.  sain-NEPA  as  standby:  Own  gen.  only-100X  from  own  generators.
Source:  NIDB/IBRD  Establishment  Survey,  1988.
Table  A2:  DISTRIBUTION  OF MANUFACTURING  ESTABLISHMENTS
SOURCE  OF ELECTRICITY  BY FIRM SIZE
Source  of Electricty
Frequency  Firm  Size
Row Pat
Col Pet  1 - 19  120-  49  150-  99  1100-199  1200-499  1500-999  11000  & 
I  i  I  I  I  I  Over  a  Total
NEPA  only  11  3  0  C  0  14
78.57  21.43  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  100.00
68.75  8.57  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  7.82
NEPA  main  3  1  26  3S  30  25  13  8  140
2.14  18.57  1  25.00  21.43  17.86  9.29  5.711 100.00
18.75  74.29  79.55  85.71  96.15  86.67  100.00  1  78.21
-- 4.  -4-  ..-...  -+-----  4--  --------  -- ____  ----------------- +
Own son.  main  2 |  4 |5  0  1 |  0  20 I10.00  20.00  j 40.00  j 25.00  J  0.00  5  .00  0.00  J 100.00
12.50  11.43  I  18.18  14.29  0.00  6.67  0.00  1011.17
Own  gen.  only |  0 |  2 I  1 |  0 I  1  7  1  0  0 |  15
0.00  :  40.00 I  20.00  0.00  200  0  20.00  0.00  100.00
10.00  .71  42.27  50.00  3.85  6.67  0.00  2.79
4  4  4  4-  .4..  4  4
Tot-l  16  35  44  35  26  15  8  179
8.94  19.55  24.58  19.55  14.53  6.38  4.47  100.00
100.00  100.00  100.00  100.00  100.00  100.00  1000  0  100.00
Source:  NIDB/IBR.D  Istablisbment  Survey,  1988.- 34  -
Table  A3:  DISTRIBUTION  OF MANUFACTURING  ESTABLISHMENTS
POWER  OUTAGE  BY FIRM SIZE
Average  Number  of  Pover  Outage  per  week
Frequency  FiLm Slsg
Row Pat
Col  Pot  1 - 19  120-  49  150-  99  1100-199  1200-499  1500-999  11000&  I 
_______________--  ..  . ..... __  . -----------  .....  --  ------+--___.____..___.+___+
t-essetbn5/vek  7  11  15  8  7  7a  3 1  s I  12.07  I 18.97  25.86  13.79  512.07  12.07  5.17  100.00
43.75 I 31.43  34.09  I 22.86  26.92  46.67  37.50  32.40
----- _.--  ---- _  ----  ------  --  --  - --  --  - ----. _  _  _  *  . _  _  _  _  _  _  _  __  _  _  _  __  _  __  _  _  __  _  _  _
S-10  week  2  20  22  19  1S  4  2  91 I  .8I  2  24:18  20.88  16:48  4:40  2.20  100.00
56.2S  1.29  57*69  26.67  25.00  50.84
Hore  tbanl10/veek  01  I4  7  8  41  4  30
0.00  13.33  23.33  26.67  13.33  13.33  10.00  100.00
0.00  11.43  13.91  22.86  15.36  26.67  37.50  16.76
Total  16  35  44  35  26  15  a  179
8.94  19.55  24.58  19.55  14.53  8.38  4.47  100.00
100.00  100.00  100.00  100.00  100.00  100.00  100.00  100.00
Source:  NIZOSIIRD  Establishment  Survey,  1988.
Table  A4:  DISTRIBUTION  OF MANUFACTURING  ESTABLISHMENTS
BOREHOLES  BY FIRM SIZE
Own Boreholes  for  Production  Operation?
Frequ-ncy  Firm  Size
Row P  t
Col  Pet  1  - 19  120-  49  15-  99  1100-199  1200-499  1S00-999  11000  &  I
I  I  I  I  |  |  Over  | Total
yES  I  01  SI  16  24  "17  1  61  79 I  0.00  6.33  20.25  30.38  21.52  13.92  7.59  100.00
0.00  14.29  36.36  68.57  65.38  73.33  75.00  44.13
NO  161  30|  28|  11|  91  4  2  I  100
16.00  I 30.00  28.00  11.00  9.00  4.00  2.00  I  100.00
100.00  85.71  63.64  31.43  34.62  26.67  25.00  55.87
_ _ _ _ _ _ _  ._  _ _ _ _  _ _ + _ _ _  _ _ _ _ + _  _ _ _ _ _ _  - - - - ----  - - - - - - --  - - - - - - --  - - - - - -
Total  16  35  44  35  26  15  8  179
8.94  19.55  24.58  19.55  14.53  8.38  4.47  100.00
100.00  100.00  100.00  100.00  ::00.00  100.00  100.00  100.CO
Source:  NIDBIIBRD Establishment  Survey,  1988.- 35 -
Table A5: DTSTRIBUTION  OF HANUFACTURING ESTABLISHMENTS
VEIIICLES  FOR SHIPMENT BY FIRM SIZE
Own Vehicles  for  Shipment  of  Goods?
Frequency  Firm  Size
Col  Pet  1 - 19  120-  49  150-  99  100-199  1200-499  1500-999  11000g 
Ov r~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~7  Total
----  -----.  --- 4------4--------4
YES  8  21  26  25  18  l  1  113
7.08  18.58  23.01  22.12  15.93  9.73  3.54  100.00
50.00  60.00  59.09  71.43  69.23  73.33  50.00  63.13
NO  8  14  18  1o  8  4  4  66
12.12  21.21  27.27  15.15  12.12  6.06  6.06  100.00
50.00  40.00  40.91  28.57  30.77  26.67  50.00  36.87
Total  16  35  44  35  26  15  8  179
8.94  19.55  24.58  19.55  14.53  8.38  4.47  100.00
l00.00  100.00  100.00  100.00  100.00  100.00  100.00  100.00
Source:  NIDBI8BRD  Establishment  Survey,  1988.
Table A6: DISTRIBUTION  OF MANUFACTURING  ESTABLISHMENTS
MOTORCYCLES BY FIRM SIZE
Own Motocycles  for  Messenger/Courier?
Frequency  Firm  Size
Row Pct
Cal  Pat  1  - 19  120-  49  150-  99  1100-199  1200-499  1500-999  11000  &
_________.I+-+ll  l  +  |Over  T  Total
YES  0  6  11  18  16  11  SI  67
0.00  8.96  16.42  26.87  23.88  16.42  7.46  100.00
0.00  17.14  25.00  51.43  61.54  73.33  62.50 I 37.43
-------  ---  --  ----  --  --  - --  --  - --  - ---- 4.  - --  --  4.--
NO  I  161  29  331  171  101  4  3  112
14.29 I 25.891  29.46 I 15.18  5  8.93  i  3.57  2.68  100.00
100.00  82.86  75.00  1 48.57 I 38.46  26.67  37.50  62.57
__  _  _  _  +  _  _  __-  ----  ------------- _-__  _  _+_-4.  -__  - 4.---  -------
Total  16  35  44  35  26  15  8  179
8.94  19.55  24.58  19.55  14.53  8.38  4.47  100.00
100.00  100.00  100.00  100.00  100.00  100.00  100.00  100.00
Source:  NIDBIIBRD Establishment  Survey,  1988.- 36 -
Table A7: DISTRIBUTION OF MANUFACTURING ESTABLISHMENTS
RADIO EQUIPMENT  BY FIRM SIZE
Own  a  Radlo  Transmitting  Equipment?
Frequency  Firm  Size
Row  Pot
Col  Pet  1 - 19  120-  49  150-  99  1100-199  1200-499  1500-999  11000  &
Ova  |  Total
--------- +--------+--------+--------+--------+--------+--------+-----__-+
YES  01  21  10  19  15  14  6  66
I  0.00  3.03  15.15  28.79  22.73  21.21  9.09  100.00
0.00  5.71  22.73  54.29  57.69  93.33  75.00  36.87
NO  161  33  341  16  21  1  2  113
14.16  29.20  30.09  14.16  9.73  0.88  1.77  100.00
100.00  94.29  77.27  45.71  42.31  6.67  25.00  63.13
Total  16  35  44  35  26  15  8  179
8.94  19.55  24.58  19.55  14.53  8.38  4.47  100.00
100.00  100  .00  100.00  100.00  100.00  .00  100.00  100.00
Source: NIDBIIBRD Establishment Survey, 1988.
Table A8: DISTRIBUTION  OF MANUFACTURING ESTABLISHMENTS
REGION BY TRAVEL HOURS
Region
Travel Hours for  Managerial  Meetings
Frequency
Row  Pet
Col  Pet  Less  than  5 - l&  15  &  more
5  hours  I  I  Total
Lagos  26  32  24  82
31.71  39.02  29.27  100.00
46.43  46.38  44.44  45.81
Anambra/Imo  9  |  17  10 |  36
25.0090  47.22  27.78  100.00
16.07  24.64  18.52  20.11
Kadun/Kano  211  201  20 1  61
34.43  32.79  32.79  10000
37.50  28.99  37.04  34.08
------------ +-----------+------------4-----------
Total  56  69  54  179
31.28  38.55  30.17  100.00
100.00  100.00  100.00  100.0on
Source: NIDBIIBRD Establishment Survey, 1988.37 -
Table  A9:  DISTRIBUTION  OF MANUFACTURING  ESTABLISHMENTS
VEHICLES  FOR  WORKERS  BY FIRM  SIZE
Own Vehicles for Workers?
Frequency  Flrm Sim*
Row Pct
Col Pct  1  - 19  120-  49  150- 99  1100-199  1200-499  1soo-sss 
11oER  ITtal
l  |  |  l  l  |~~~~~~OVER  |Toa
_  _  _  ___+__  __ __  _  _  _4_  _  __  _  _  .._  _  +  _  ..  _  _  _  _  . _  _  _  ..  _  _  _  _
YES  2  2  3078  S  S  3  1  1  26
7.69  7.69  30.77  19.23  19.23  11.54  3.85  100.00
12.50  5.71  18.18  14.29  19.23  20.00  12.50  14.53
NO  I  14 I  33  361  301  21  12  7  153
s9.1 21.57  1  23.53  19.61  13.73  7.84  4.58  100.00
37.50  94.29  81.82  85.71  80.77  80.00  87.50  85.47 -________.+_  _  __  _  _  __  _  _+  _  _  __  +  __  _  _  +________+________+_______
Total  16  35  44  35  26  1S  8  179
8.94  19.55  24.58  19.55  14.53  8.38  4.47  100.00
Source:  NIDB/IBRD  Establishment Survey, 1988.
Table  AIO:  DISTRIBUTION  OF  MANUFACTURING  ESTABLISHMENTS
VEHICLES  FOR  GARBAGE  DISPOSAL  BY FIRM  SIZE
Own Vehicles for Garbage Disposal?
Frequency  Firm Sl.e
Row Pct
Col Pct  1 - 19  120-  49  150- 99  1100-199 1200-499 1500-999  11000 &  I
-I  I  I  I  I  |OVER  I  Total
YES  0  0  5  11  3  3  2  24
0.00  0.00  20.83  45.83  12.50  12.50  8.33  100.00
0.00  0.00  11.36  31.43  11.54  20.00  25.00  13.41
NO  16  35  39  24  23  121  6 1  155
I  10.32 I  22.58  25.16  15.48  14.84  7.74  3.87  100.00
100.00  I  100.00  88.64  68.57  88.46  80.00 1  75.00  86.59
Total  16  3S  44  35  26  15  8  179
8.94  19.55  24.58  19.55  14.S3  8.38  4.47  100.00
Source: NIDB/IBRD  Establishment Survey, 1988.- 38 -
Table  All: CAPITAL  COST  OF PRIVATE  POWER  GENERATION
(Average  Current  Market  Value)
(A)  (B)  (C)  (D)  (E)  (F)
State  Firm  Generators  Other  Machinery  &
Size  Facilities  Equipment  A/C  B/C  (A+B)/C
(1000  Naira)  (Percent)
All  States All  825.56  128.28  9150.71  9.02  1.40  10.42
All  States Small  220.08  17.03  956.78  23.00  1.78  24.78
Large  1007.20  161.11  11608.88  8.68  1.39  10.06
Lagos  All  973.04  165.31  9675.00  10.06  1.71  11.77
Anambra  All  667.79  73.50  9091.29  7.35  0.81  8.15
Imo  All  547.50  103.40  14490.80  3.78  0.71  4.49
Kaduna  All  988.30  158.89  7921.48  12.48  2.01  14.48
Kano  All  492.71  50.79  7274.00  6.77  0.70  7.47
Lagos  Small  207.93  17.13  786.33  26.44  2.18  28.62
Large  1167.56  202.35  11934.83  9.78  1.70  11.48
Anambra  Small  254.37  14.63  73C.75  34.43  1.98  36.41
Large  1219.00  152.00  20228.00  6.03  0.75  6.78
Imo  Small  120.00  3.00  400.00  30.00  0.75  30.75
Large  595.00  114.56  16056.44  3.71  0.71  4.42
Kaduna  Small  326.00  42.50  1261.50  25.84  3.37  29.21
Large  1103.48  180.05  9079.74  12.15  1.98  14.14
Kano  Small  168.12  8.25  1411.63  11.91  0.58  12.49
Large  605.61  64.40  9313.09  6.50  0.69  7.19
Number  of
Observations  156  158  156  --  --  --
Source: Establishment  Survey  1988,  Nigeria  Infrastructure  Research  Project.- 39 -
Table  A12: CAPITAL  COST  OF  PRIVATE  WATER  SUPPLY
(Average  Current  Market  Value)
(A)  (B)  (C)  (D)  (E)  (F)
State  Firm  Boreholes  Other  Machinery  &
Size  Facilities  Equipment  A/C  B/C  (A+B)/C
(1000  Naira)  (Percent)
All  States  All  144.57  116.84  13670.46  1.06  0.85  1.91
All  States  Small  22.50  9.25  1130.50  1.99  0.82  2.81
Large  151.97  123.36  14430.45  1.05  0.85  1.91
Lagos  All  146.93  98.96  11786.13  1.25  0.84  2.09
Anambra  All  428.00  180.00  2850.00  15.02  6.32  21.33
Imo  All  117.00  363.80  25529.00  0.46  1.43  1.88
Kaduna  All  103.33  133.00  15038.33  0.69  0.88  1.57
Kano  All  72.50  42.83  23670.17  0.31  0.18  0.49
Lagos  Small  22.50  9.25  1130.50  1.99  0.82  2.81
Large  156.88  106.14  12638.58  1.24  0.84  2.08
Anambra  Small  --  --  --  --  --  --
Large  428.00  180.00  2850.00  15.02  6.32  21.33
Imo  Small  --  --  --  --  --  --
Large  117.00  363.80  25529.00  0.46  1.43  1.88
Kaduna  Small  --  --  --  --  --  --
Large  103.33  133.00  15038.33  0.69  0.88  1.57
Kano  Small  --  --  --  --  --  --
Large  72.50  42.83  23670.17  0.31  0.18  0.49
Number  of
Observations  70  70  70  --  --  --
Source: Establishment  Survey  1988,  Nigeria  Infrastructure  Research  Project.- 40 -
Table A13: CAPITAL COST OF PRIVATE  TRANSPORT FOR  WORKERS
(Average  Current  Market Value)
(A)  (B)  (C)  (D)  (E)  (F)
State  Firm  Vehicles  All  Machinery &
Size  for  Vehicles  Equipment  A/B  A/C  B/(B+C)
Workers
(1000  Naira)  (Percent)
All States  All  426.35  1419.48  14913.96  30.04  2.86  8.69
All States  Small  82.50  2089.50  1502.50  3.95  5.49  58.17
Large  459.10  1355.67  16191.24  33.86  2.84  7.73
Lagos  All  787.10  1578.00  29086.90  49.88  2.71  5.15
Anambra  All  150.00  1679.00  505.00  8.93  29.70  76.8&
Imo  All  198.00  1596.00  2976.60  12.41  6.65  34.90
Kaduna  All  115.00  1832.00  3017.00  6.28  3.81  37.78
Kano  All  113.00  709.00  6146.00  15.94  1.84  10.34
Lagos  Small  --  --  --  --  --  --
Large  787.10  1578.00  2908O.90  49.88  2.71  5.15
Anambra  Small  150.00  1679.00  505.00  8.93  29.70  76.88
Large  --  --  --  --  --  --
Imo  Small  --  --  --  --  --  --
Large  198.00  1596.00  2976.60  12.41  6.65  34.90
Kaduna  Small  --  --  --  --  --  --
Large  115.00  1832.00  3017.00  6.28  3.81  37.78
Kano  Small  15.00  2500.00  2500.00  0.60  0.60  50.00
Large  137.50  261.25  7057.50  52.63  1.95  3.57
Number of
Observations  23  23  23  --  --  --
Source:  Establishment Survey 1988,  Nigeria Infrastructure  Research Project.- 41 -
Table A14: CAPITAL COST OF PRIVATE  TRANSPORT FOR SHIPMENT OF GOODS
(Average  Current  Market Value)
(A)  (B)  (C)  (D)  (E)  (F)
State  Firm  Vehicles  All  Machinery &
Size  for  Vehicles  Equipment  A/B  A/C  B/(B+C)
Shipments
(1000  Naira)  (Percent)
All States  All  386.73  786.75  8368.68  49.16  4.62  8.59
All States  Small  82.14  203.57  750.11  40.35  10.95  21.35
Large  489.48  983.48  10938.80  49.77  4.47  8.25
Lagos  All  407.19  1006.65  10286.63  40.45  3.96  8.91
Anambra  All  150.57  249.79  757.50  60.28  19.88  24.80
Imo  All  1144.00  1929.57  18203.57  59.29  6.28  9.58
Kaduna  All  387.68  595.42  5242.68  65.11  7.39  10.20
Kano  All  224.79  350.84  8230.37  64.07  2.73  4.09
Lagos  Small  60.50  144.00  928.70  42.01  6.51  13.42
Large  489.74  1212.05  12514.71  40.41  3.91  8.83
Anambra  Small  89.17  242.42  328.08  36.78  27.18  42.49
Large  519.00  294.00  3334.00  176.53  15.57  8.10
Imo  Small  --  --  --  --  --  --
Large  1144.00  1929.57  18203.57  59.29  6.28  9.58
Kaduna  Small  50.00  166.67  1172.33  30.00  4.26  12.45
Large  451.00  675.81  6005.88  66.73  7.51  10.11
Kano  Small  158.33  283.67  1420.67  55.82  11.15  16.64
Large  237.25  363.44  9507.19  65.28  2.50  3.68
Number of
Observations  111  111  111  --  --  --
Source:  Establishment Survey 1988,  Nigeria Infrastructure  Research Project.- 42
Table  A15:  CAPITAL  COST  OF PRIVATE  TRANSPORT  FOR  GARBAGE  DISPOSAL
(Average  Current  Market  Value)
(A)  (B)  (C)  (D)  (E)  (1)
State  Firm  Vehicles  All  Machinery  &
Size  for  Vehicles  Equipment  A/B  A/C  B/(B+C)
Garbage
(1000  Naira)  (Percent)
All States All  64.72  1012.08  13411  6.39  1.48  7.02
All  States Small  2.00  40.00  1300.00  5.00  0.15  2.99
Large  67.33  1052.58  13915.62  6.40  0.48  7.03
Lagos  All  98.33  632.83  6403.83  15.54  1.54  8.99
Anambra  All  73.00  1860.00  28997.50  3.92  0.25  6.03
Imo  All  --  --  --  --  --  --
Kaduna  All  71.00  2753.50  26902.00  2.58  0.26  9.28
Kano  All  41.09  277.36  6659.45  14.81  0.62  4.00
Lagos  Small  --  --  --  --  --  --
Large  98.33  632.83  6403.83  15.54  1.54  8.99
Anambra  Small  2.00  40.00  1300.00  5.00  0.15  2.99
Large  96.67  2466.67  38230.00  3.92  0.25  6.06
Imo  Small  --  --  --  --  --  --
Large  --  --  --  --  --  --
Kaduna  Small  --  --  --  --  --  --
Large  71.00  2753.50  26902.00  2.58  0.26  9.28
Kano  Small  --  --  --  --  --  --
Large  41.09  277.36  6659.45  14.81  0.62  4.00
Number  of
Observations  25  25  25  --  --  --
Source: Establishment  Survey  1988,  Nigeria  Infrastructure  Research  Project.- 43 .
Table  A16:  CAPITAL  COST  OF PRIVATE  CONMUNICATIONS
(Average  Current  Market  Value)
(A)  (B)  (C)
State  Firm  Radio  Machinery  &
Size  Equipment  Equipment  A/B
(1000  Naira)  (Percent)
All  States  All  84.15  14296.02  0.59
All  States  Small  19.00  1283.00  1.48
Large  86.19  14702.67  0.59
Lagos  All  118.00  14063.12  0.84
Anambra  All  40.75  29222.50  0.14
Imo  All  104.33  7241.00  1.44
Kaduna  All  37.77  13918.31  0.27
Kano  All  38.00  13818.00  0.28
Lagos  Small  --  --  --
Large  118.00  14063.12  0.84
Anambra  Small  --  --  --
Large  40.75  29222.50  0.14
Imo  Small  --  --  --
Large  104.33  7241.00  1.44
Kaduna  Small  30.00  1529.00  1.96
Large  38.42  14950.75  0.26
Kano  Small  8.00  1037.00  0.77
Large  41.33  15238.11  0.27
Number  of
Observations  66  66  --
Source: Establishment  Survey  1988,  Nigeria  Infrastructure  Research  Project.- 44 -
Table  A17:  CAPITAL  COST  OF TOTAL  PRIVATE  INFRASTRUCTURE
(Average  Current  Market  Value)
(A)  (B)  (C)
State  Firm  Total  Private  _a/  Total /
Size  Infrastructure Capital  Stock  A/B
(1000  Naira)  (Percent)
All  States  All  1331.48  9867.69  13.49
All  States  Small  252.07  1013.56  24.87
All  States  Large  1710.96  12980.48  13.18
Lagos  All  1644.94  10253.36  16.04
Anambra  All  700.77  6376.45  10.99
Imo  All  1859.50  15952.10  11.66
Kaduna  All  1468.18  10840.50  13.54
Kano  All  716.06  8590.58  8.34
Lagos  Small  253.87  888.75  28.57
Lagos  Large  1992.70  12594.77  15.82
Anambra  Small  218.37  639.75  34.13
Anambra  Large  1987.17  21674.33  9.17
Imo  Small  148.00  400.00  37.00
Imo  Large  2049.67  17680.11  11.59
Kaduna  Small  413.50  1424.50  29.03
Kaduna  Large  1643.96  12409.83  13.25
Kant  Small  248.12  1882.00  13.18
Kano  Large  865.80  10737.32  8.06
Number  of
Observations  173  173  --
a/  Includes  electric  generators,  boreholes,  radio  transmission  equipment,
and  vehicles  for  workers'  commuting,  goods  shipments,  and  waste  disposal.
k/ Includes  machinery,  equipment,  and  all  vehicl.es
Source: Establishment  Survey  1988,  Nigeria  Infrastructure  Research  Project.- 45 -
Table  A18: COST  COMPOSITION  OF OWN  ELECTRIC  POWER  GENERATION  PER  KWH
Firm  Size  Generators  Accessories  Fuel Maintenance  Wage  Total
All Firms  (Naira)  3.482  0.327  0.352  0.318  0.132  4.612
(Percent)  75.50  7.10  7.64  6.91  2.86  100.00
0-9  0.571  0.085  0.077  0.000  0.000  0.732
77.93  11.57  10.50  0.00  0.00  100.00
10-19  0.843  0.147  0.100  0.109  0.045  1.243
67.82  11.80  8.03  8.74  3.61  100.00
20-49  5.579  0.244  0.238  0.Z63  0.133  6.457
86.40  3.78  3.69  4.07  2.06  100.00
50-99  3.403  0.382  0.390  0.420  0.181  4.775
71.25  7.99  8.17  8.79  3.80  100.00
100-199  3.808  0.349  0.280  0.298  0.140  4.876
78.11  7.15  5.74  6.12  2.88  100.00
200-499  2.791  0.514  0.433  0.277  0.091  4.106
67.98  12.51  10.53  6.76  2.22  100.00
500-999  1.488  0.159  0.502  0.165  0.066  2.379
62.52  6.67  21.09  6.95  2.77  100.00
1000  & Over  1.799  0.077  0.566  0.718  0.155  3.315
54.28  2.33  17.07  21.65  4.66  100.00
Note:  For  the  smaple  firms  as a  whole,  25.48  percent  of electric  power  supply
came  from  own  generators.
Source:  NIDB/IBRD  Establishment  Survey,  1988.- 46 -






Col  Pct  1  - 19  120-  49  I5O-  99  1100-199  1200-499  1500-999  1100O  & 
l  l  I  l  l  l  Over  I  Total
--------.-  +----  +-----------------  -------  4.
Lagos  2  16  22  15  14  10  3  82
2.  *  19.51  126.83  18.29  17.07  12.20  3.66  100.00
12.50  *5.71  50.00  *2.86  5 3.85  66.67  137.50  1  5  el
Anambra  12  8  3  1  1  1  26
46.15  30.77  11.54  0.00  3.65  3.85  3.85  100.00
75.00  22.86  6.82  0.00  3.63  6.67  12.50  14.53 __  _  __  _  _  __  _  _  ___  ___  _+  ___  __  +..  __  ___  __  ___  _+  ___  __  +__  __  __
inc  1  0  2  2  3  1  1  10
10.00  0.00  20.20.  0  . 30.00  10.00  10.00  100.00
6.25  0.00  4.55  5 .71  11.54  .67  12.50  5.59 -4.-  4.~~02  4.--::  4.-67.12.  4.-  +
dun  0  *  9  6  4  21  3|  28
I  0.00  14.29  I 32.14  21.43  14.29  7.14  10.71  100.00
0.00  11.43  20.45  17.14  15.38  13.33  37.50  15.64
Kano  1  7  a  I  121  *  I  1  01  3S
I3.03  1  21.21  I 24.24  36.36  12.12  I  3.03  0.00  100.00
I  6.2S  20.00  I 16.18  I 34.29  15.38  I  6.67  I  0.00  18.44
Total  16  35  44  35  26  15  8  179
6.94  19.55  24.58  19.55  14.53  8.38  4.47  100.00
100.00  100.00  100.00  100.00  100.00  100.00  100.00  100.00
Ource:  NIDB1IBRD  Project  Est&blishment  Survey,  1988- 47 -






Col  Pat  3100  13200  13300  13400  13500  13600  13700  13.00  13900  I Total
Lagos  61  101  41  71  231  31  21  25  2  82
7.32  12.2014.881  8.54  28.05  S.6612.441  30.49  2.44  100.00
30.00  29.41  44.44  36.84  65.71  20.00  66.67  59.52  100.00  45.81
Anambra  3  1  2  6  4  8  0  2  O  26
11.54  3.85  7.69  23.08  15.38  30.77  0.00  7.69  0.00  100.00
15.00  2.94  22.22  31.58  11.43  53.33  0.00  4.76  0.00  14.53 -__  _  _+__  _  _  _ .__  _  _  _._  _  _  _._  _  _  _  .__  __  __ .__  __  __ .__  ___.  .__  __  __ ._  _  __  _ .9
Imo  1  3  0  2  2  1  O  1  0  10
10.00  30.00  0.00  20.00  20.00  10.00  0.00  10.00  0.00  100.00
5.00  8.82  0.00  10.53  5.71  6.67  0.00  2.38  - 0.00  5.59
Kaduna  41  6 1  2 I  31  31  1 1  0 1  91  O1  28 i14.29  21.43 I  7.14  I 10.71  l  10.71 I  3.57  0.00  32.14  0.00  100.00
20.00  17.65  22.22 I 15.79  8.57  6.67  j  0.00  21.43  0.00  15.64
Kano  61  14  11  11  31  21  11  51  Oj  33
18.18  42.42  3.03  j  3.03  9.09  6.06  3.03  i  15.15  0.00  I  100.00
30.00  4  *1.18  11.11  1  5.26  i  8.571 113.33  l  33.33  l  11.90  I  0.00  I 18.44 -4..  4..  4  4  4..~~-  ---  --  ----  -------- 4---
Total  20  34  9  19  35  15  3  42  2  179
11.17  18.99  5.03  10.61  19.55  8.38  1.68  23.46  1.12  100.00
100.00  100.00  100.00  100.00  100.00  100.00  100.00  100.00  100.00  100.00
Notes: The  Standard  Industrial  Classification  (SIC)  codes  refer  to  the  folloivngt  31-food  and  beverages,
32-textiles  and  leathers  33-wood;  34-papert  35-chemical  and  rubberg  36-non-cetal  mineral,
37-basic  metall  38-fabricated  metal,  electrical  machinery,  and  transport  equipment;  *nd 39-others.
Source:  NIDB/IBRD  Project  EstabILshment  Survey,  1988- 48 -






Col  Pet  1 - 19  120- 9  150-  99  1100-199  1200-499  1500-999  11000  &
Oe  r  Total
------------.---------------  - -+  ----  - --  ---
3100  71  7  4  4  0  0  20
1.00  35.00  20.00  20.00  20.00  0.00  0.00 I  100.00
I  6.25  20.00  9.09  11.43  15.38  0.00  0.00  11.17
- ------ +  ------- +  9---4.-------
3200  1  3  7  9  4  4  6  34
2.94  8.82  20.59  26.47  11.76  11.76  17.65  100.00
6.25  8.57  15.91  25.71  15.38  26.67  75.00  18.99
+4t.+--  - --+------_-+-----------------
3300  1  3  2  1  21  0  0  9
-1.11  33.33  I2.22  11:11  22.22  0.00  0:00  100.00
6.25  8-57  4-.  - 2.86  7.69  0.00  0-0  .03
3400  I  S  6 I  3 i  2 I  1  t  2 I  0  i  '9
26.32 J  31.58  15.79  10.53  5.26  10.53  0.00  100.00
31.25  i 17.14  1  6.82  5.71  3.85  13.33  0.00  10.61
3500  I  0  I  14 I  71  41  3  2  1  35
0.00  1  14.29  40.00  20.00  11.43  8.57  5.71 I  100.00
I 0.00  14.29  31.82  20.00  I  13.38  20.00  25.00 f  19.55
+  t  +-----  ---  +-----  ____+------------------------------
3600  7  01  31  21  3 1  01  01  15
46.67  0.00  20.00  13.33  20:00  0.00  0.00  100.00
43.75  0  0.00  6.82 1  5.71  1  1.5:  a 0.00  0.0  8.38
---  - ---------------  +  -
3700  0  01  01  21  01  1  01  3
0.00  0.00  0.00  1 66.67  0.00  j  33.33  0.00  100.00
0.00  0.00  0.00  5.71 i  0.00  6.67  1  0.00  1.68
- - - - - - --  - - - -- - - - - -- - - ...-.  .-.  .
3800  I  1  101  10  1  8a  5  0  42
23  223.81  1  3.1  A190 19.0S  11.90  0.00  100.00
6.25  28.57  22.73  22.86  30.77  33.33  1  0.00  23.46
3900  2  01  1 I  1 I  01  0 I  0 I  0 I  2
I 0.00  1 50.00  5  S0.00  l  0.00 1  0.00  1  0.00 I 0.00 I  100.00
… I  0.00 I  2.86 1  2.27 1  0.00 l  0.00 1  0.00 10.00  1.12
Total  16  35  44  35  26  15  8  179
8.94  19.55  24.58  19.55  14.53  8.38  4.47  100.00
100.00  100.00  100.00  100.00  100.00  100.00  100.00  100.00
Notest  The  Standard  Industrial  Classification  (SIC)  codes  refer  to the  following:  31-food
and  beverages;  32-textUles  and leather;  33-wood;  34-paper  35-chemical  and  rubber;
36-non-metal  mineral;  37-basic  metals  38-fabricated  metal,  electrical  machinery,
and  transport  equipmentg  and  39-others.
Sources  NIDB/IBRD  Project  Establishment  Survey,  1988- 49 -
Table  A22:  SAMPLE  FRAME:  LISTING  FROM  FEDERAL  OFFICE  OF STATISTICS
All five  states
STATE  Small A/  Large  Total
A. Lagos  108  357  465
B.  Anambra  137  64  201
C. Imo  36  21  57
D.  Kaduna  63  45  108
E. Kano  344  119  463
Total  688  606  1294
A. Lagos  State
LGA  Small  Large  Total
Badagry  5  4  9
Epe  0  1  1
Ikeja  41  159  200
Ikorodu  2  5  7
Lagos  Island  17  66  83
Lagos  Mainland  27  48  75
Mushin  15  61  76
Shomolu  1  13  14
Total  108  357  465
B.  Anambra  State
Small  Large  Total
Enugu  54  24  78
Onitsha  32  24  56
Total  86  48  134
C.  Imo  State
Small  Large  Total
Ikwuano/Umuahia  6  2  8
Obioma-Ngwa  (Aba)  19  14  33
Owerri  7  5  12
Total  32  21  53
D.  Kaduna  State
Small  Large  Total
Kaduna  19  28  47
Kaduna  South  2  8  10
Zaria  31  7  38
Total  52  43  95
E.  Kano State
Small  Large  Total
Kano  105  114  219
g/  Establishments  with less  than  50  employees.- 50 -
Table A23: REALIZED SAMPLE
A. Target Size and Realized Sample  ize
Target  Realized Sample
State  Freq  (%)  A.A. & Co. (%)  NIDB a/(%)  Total  (%)
Lagos  100  30.8  82  45.8  12  35.3  94  44.1
Anambra  60  18.5  26  14.5  7  20.6  33  15.5
Imo  35  10.8  10  5.6  6  17.6  16  7.5
Kaduna  55  16.9  28  15.6  6  17.6  34  16.0
Kano  75  23.1  33  18.4  3  8.8  36  16.9
Total  325  100.0  179  100.0  34  100.0  213  100.0
a/  NIDB completed the survey for 32 establishments located in 12 other
states.
B. Sample Distribution  by Small and Large Establishments
_  Target  Realized Sample
State  Small-b/Large  (%)  Total  Small  Large  (%)  Total
Lagos  24  76  76.00  100  19  75  79.79  94
Anambra  28  32  53.33  60  23  10  30.30  33
Imo  21  14  40.00  35  3  13  81.25  16
Kaduna  25  30  54.55  55  4  30  88.24  34
Kano  36  39  52.00  75  9  27  75.00  36
Total  134  191  58.77  325  58  155  72.77  213
h/  Establishments  with less than 50 employees.Figure  Al:  DISTRIBUTION  OF  MANUFACTURING ESTABLISHMENTS:
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